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Abstract
In the past decades, the world has witnessed how essential modern networks, such as data centers
and enterprise networks, have become in our daily lives. However, on the other hand, configuring
and maintaining a modern network, is a challenging and error-prone process. Administrators
must often consider security policies from a variety of sources simultaneously, including regulatory
requirements, industry standards, to mitigate attack vectors. Erroneous implementation of a policy,
however, can result in costly data breaches and intrusions. Relying on humans to discover and
troubleshoot violations is slow and prone to error, considering the speed at which new attack
vectors propagate and the increasing network dynamics, partly an effect of SDN. To ensure the
network is always in a state consistent with the desired policies, administrators need frameworks
to automatically diagnose and repair violations as the network evolves.
To address this problem, in this dissertation, we present a system automatically synthesizing
network changes that meets a network correctness specification given as a policy. If we consider
a network as a distributed program, the problem here is essentially a program synthesis problem.
Recent work on program synthesis illustrates many benefits of allowing the user to augment the
correctness specification with some guidance. We adopt a similar philosophy: our system is guided
by user instructions to constrain the space of allowed implementations in order to keep pace with
network dynamics. As the foundation of our system, we first develop a verification technique
that detects network-wide invariant violations responsively. Based on the verification results, our
core algorithm repairs network updates in two aspects. If an update violates a policy defined by
an administrator, such as reachability or segmentation, our algorithm transforms the update into
one that complies with the policy. In addition, given two correct network states, our algorithm
synthesizes a feasible and efficient update ordering to migrate the network from one to the other.
With our prototype implementation, we tested our system on physical testbed, emulated SDN
ii
networks, and a large enterprise network’s operational traces. We demonstrated that it is practical
and efficient to use user instructions as guidance to incrementally build/maintain a network state,
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Modern networks, such as data center networks and enterprise networks, are essential in our
daily lives. Network operators often establish a set of correctness conditions to ensure successful
operation of the network, such as the preference of one path over another, the prevention of un-
trusted traffic from entering a secure zone, or loop and black hole avoidance. As networks become
an increasingly crucial backbone for critical services, the ability to construct networks that obey
correctness criteria is becoming even more important.
On the other hand, packet forwarding in modern networks is a complex process, involving
codependent functions running on hundreds or thousands of devices, such as routers, switches,
and firewalls from different vendors. Although a substantial amount of effort is required to ensure
networks’ correctness, security and fault tolerance, faults in the network state still arise commonly
in practice, including loops, suboptimal routing, black holes and access control violations that make
services unavailable or prone to attacks (e.g., DDoS attacks), or result in costly data breaches. How
can a human reason about the trillions of possibilities? The answer is no, people cannot comprehend
modern networks themselves.
Then can we rely on computers to solve this problem? Many have tried. The challenge of
constructing networks that work correctly has led to a variety of techniques to verify network
behaviors [16, 17, 40, 47], as well as work on configuration analysis [26, 71], and symbolic execu-
tion [22]. Those techniques are useful to find out when things go wrong, but they operate offline,
and thus only find bugs after they happen. Researchers have also investigated automated synthesis
techniques to derive network states from a set of pre-specified correctness conditions [60, 64, 67].
However, these tools are designed for uses similar to a compiler, and therefore do not work in co-
operation with network users (either operators or existing applications). For the same reason, they
would not be feasible to interactively synthesize network changes. How can a computer know what
a network is supposed to do? Like humans, computers alone cannot comprehend the networks.
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Therefore, instilling correctness into modern networks is a task that neither computers nor
humans alone can solve. In fact, problems like this also occur in domains outside of networking,
for example, theorem proving where billions of alternatives could exist for a non-trivial problem,
or missile guidance and aircraft control where humans cannot react fast enough but computers
don’t know what needs to be done. In all of these situations, we need to solve a strong AI problem.
Guidance is the key of the solution approach, which is allowing a human to “guide” what a computer
does. In theorem proving, a human gives hints and feedback to a solver, and in aircraft control, a
human gives course directions which are corrected by the computer. These systems define feedback
loops between humans and computers.
Thus, we argue the need for guided techniques to ensure correctness in modern networks. In
particular, this thesis asks a question: Is it possible to efficiently perform guided synthesis of network
state? To address this question, we designed and implemented a framework to synthesis network
state in a manner that is guided by human intent.
Figure 1.1: System Architecture.
An overview of our system is shown in figure 1.1. It interacts with user by 1) taking user input
in the form of network instructions (from network operators or applications), and 2) (optionally)
sending feedback back in the form of suggested changes on the network instructions. On the inter-
action with networking devices front, the system sends synthesized updates down to the network
2
and reads state from it. The layer in the middle does the computation. Then the question is how
to design the middle layer. There are two key objectives. First, computer needs to know if the
goal is reached. To address this, we build a responsive network verification layer. Second, there are
many candidates that could lead us towards the goal. The computer needs to know which one to
choose. More specifically, what should the state be, and when should state updates be sent. The
next subsection gives more details about each of these techniques.
1.1 Contributions
In this section, we describe the key contributions of this dissertation.
• Responsive Network Verification Layer (§ 2) As the foundation of the system, in
this component, the objective is to find out when and where things go wrong in real time.
We present a design, V eriF low, which demonstrates that the goal of real-time verification
of network-wide invariants is achievable. V eriF low leverages software-defined networking
(SDN) to obtain a picture of the network as it evolves by sitting as a layer between the
SDN controller and the forwarding devices, and checks validity of invariants as each rule is
inserted, modified or deleted. However, SDN alone does not make the problem easy. In order
to ensure real-time response, V eriF low introduces novel incremental algorithms to search
for potential violation of key network invariants — for example, availability of a path to the
destination, absence of forwarding loops, enforcement of access control policies, or isolation
between virtual networks.
• Update Timing and Ordering Synthesis (§ 3) Next, we study a following-up problem in
the space: given two correct consecutive configurations, how can we guarantee a general set
of properties are preserved during transitions from one configuration to another? This has
been referred as network consistency [63] problem. As an answer, we present CCG, a system
that enforces customizable network consistency properties with high efficiency. We highlight
the network uncertainty problem and its ramifications, and propose a network modeling
technique correctly derives consistent outputs even in the presence of uncertainty. More
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importantly, we reduce the synthesis problem to a verification problem. The core algorithm
of CCG leverages the uncertainty-aware network model, and synthesizes a feasible network
update plan (ordering and timing of control messages) via repeated verifications. That is,
CCG repairs network update sequences. In addition to ensuring that there are no violations
of consistency requirements, CCG also tries to maximize update parallelism, subject to the
constraints imposed by the requirements. Through emulations and experiments on an SDN
testbed, we show that CCG is capable of achieving a better consistency vs. efficiency trade-off
than existing mechanisms.
• Update Content Synthesis (§ 4) We then asked this question: ”is it possible to efficiently
enforce correctness policies on arbitrary data plane states?”. That is, we now relax the con-
straints (in CCG) on configurations being correct with regard to policies and only repairing
intermediate states, but also repair erroneous configurations. We propose NEAt, a system
that provides network administrators with a network analogue of a smartphone’s autocorrect.
As a transparent layer, NEAt repairs, in real-time, updates from an SDN controller that vi-
olate generic policies such as reachability, service-chaining, and segmentation detected by the
verification engine. NEAt repairs the updates by adding or removing a minimal number of
rules in order to comply with the policy by casting the problem as an optimization problem.
1.2 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter § 2 we present our real-time
network verification technique, as the foundation of the infrastructure. Using the verification tech-
nique as the means of guidance, we then present our approaches to incrementally synthesize network
behavior. In particular, we organize them in a way that we first tackle the problem from time di-
mension (Chapter § 3), and then from space dimension (Chapter § 4). Chapter § 5 discusses the
main relevant approaches available today for diagnosing and synthesizing network states. Finally,






In this chapter, I present the design of our responsive network verification layer, V eriF low.
Packet forwarding in modern networks is a complex process, involving codependent functions run-
ning on hundreds or thousands of devices, such as routers, switches, and firewalls from different
vendors. As a result, a substantial amount of effort is required to ensure networks’ correctness, secu-
rity and fault tolerance. However, faults in the network state arise commonly in practice, including
loops, suboptimal routing, black holes and access control violations that make services unavailable
or prone to attacks (e.g., DDoS attacks). Software-Defined Networking (SDN) promises to ease the
development of network applications through logically-centralized network programmability via an
open interface to the data plane, but bugs are likely to remain problematic since the complexity
of software will increase. Moreover, SDN allows multiple applications or even multiple users to
program the same physical network simultaneously, potentially resulting in conflicting rules that
alter the intended behavior of one or more applications [65].
One solution is to rigorously check network software or configuration for bugs prior to deploy-
ment. Symbolic execution [22] can catch bugs through exploration of all possible code paths, but
is usually not tractable for large software. Analysis of configuration files [26, 71] is useful, but
cannot find bugs in router software, and must be designed for specific configuration languages and
control protocols. Moreover, using these approaches, an operator who wants to ensure the net-
work’s correctness must have access to the software and configuration, which may be inconvenient
in an SDN network where controllers can be operated by other parties [65]. Another approach is
to statically analyze snapshots of the network-wide data-plane state [16, 17, 40, 47, 70]. However,
these previous approaches operate offline, and thus only find bugs after they happen.
This chapter studies the question, Is it possible to check network-wide correctness in real time as
the network evolves? If we can check each change to forwarding behavior before it takes effect, we
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can raise alarms immediately, and even prevent bugs by blocking changes that violate important
invariants. For example, we could prohibit changes that violate access control policies or cause
forwarding loops.
However, prior to our solution techniques for checking networks are inadequate for this purpose
as they operate on timescales of seconds to hours [17, 40, 47]. 1 Delaying updates for processing
can harm consistency of network state, and increase reaction time of protocols with real-time
requirements such as routing and fast failover; and processing a continuous stream of updates in a
large network could introduce scaling challenges. Hence, we need some way to perform verification
at very high speeds, i.e., within milliseconds. Moreover, checking network-wide properties requires
obtaining a view of network-wide state.
V eriF low leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to obtain a picture of the network as
it evolves by sitting as a layer between the SDN controller and the forwarding devices, and checks
validity of invariants as each rule is inserted, modified or deleted. However, SDN alone does
not make the problem easy. In order to ensure real-time response, V eriF low introduces novel
incremental algorithms to search for potential violation of key network invariants — for example,
availability of a path to the destination, absence of forwarding loops, enforcement of access control
policies, or isolation between virtual networks.
Our prototype implementation supports both OpenFlow [51] version 1.1.0 and IP forwarding
rules, with the exception that the current implementation does not support actions that modify
packet headers. We microbenchmarked V eriF low using a stream of updates from a simulated
IP network, constructed with Rocketfuel [12] topology data and real BGP traces [15]. We also
evaluated its overhead relative to the NOX controller [29] in an emulated OpenFlow network using
Mininet [7]. We find that V eriF low is able to verify network-wide invariants within hundreds
of microseconds as new rules are introduced into the network. V eriF low’s verification phase has
little impact on network performance and inflates TCP connection setup latency by a manageable
amount, around 15.5% on average.
We give an overview of data plane verification and SDN (§ 2.1) before presenting V eriF low’s
design (§ 2.2), implementation (§ 2.3), and evaluation (§ 2.4). We then discuss future (§ 6.2) and
1The average run time of reachability tests in [40] is 13 seconds, and it takes a few hundred seconds to perform
reachability checks in Anteater [47].
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related work (§ 5.1), and conclude (§ 2.5).
2.1 Overview of Approach
V eriF low adopts the approach of data plane verification. As argued in [47], verifying network
correctness in the data plane offers several advantages over verifying higher-level code such as
configuration files. First, it is closely tied to the network’s actual behavior, so that it can catch
bugs that other tools miss. For example, configuration analysis [26, 71] cannot find bugs that occur
in router software. Second, since data-plane state has relatively simple formats and semantics that
are common across many higher-layer protocols and implementations, it simplifies rigorous analysis
of a network.
Early data plane verification algorithms were developed in [70], and systems include
FlowChecker [16], Anteater [47], and Header Space Analysis [40]. The latter two systems were
applied to operational networks and uncovered multiple real-world bugs, validating the data plane
analysis approach. However, as noted previously, these are offline rather than real-time systems.
V eriF low performs real-time data plane verification in the context of software defined networks
(SDNs). An SDN comprises, at a high level, (1) a standardized and open interface to read and write
the data plane of network devices such as switches and routers; (2) a controller, a logically central-
ized device that can run custom code and is responsible for transmitting commands (forwarding
rules) to network devices.
SDNs are a good match for data plane verification. First, a standardized data plane interface
such as OpenFlow [11] simplifies unified analysis across all network devices. Second, SDNs ease
real-time data plane verification since the stream of updates to the network is observable at the
controller.
SDN thus simplifies V eriF low’s design. Moreover, we believe SDNs can benefit significantly
from V eriF low’s data plane verification layer: the network operator can verify that the network’s
forwarding behavior is correct, without needing to inspect (or trust) relatively complex controller
code, which may be developed by parties outside the network operator’s control.
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2.2 Design
Checking network-wide invariants in the presence of complex forwarding elements can be a hard
problem. For example, packet filters alone make reachability checks NP-Complete [47]. Aiming
to perform these checks in real-time is therefore challenging. Our design tackles this problem as
follows. First, we monitor all the network update events in a live network as they are generated
by network control applications, the devices, or the network operator. Second, we confine our
verification activities to only those parts of the network whose actions may be influenced by a new
update. Third, rather than checking invariants with a general-purpose tool such as a SAT or BDD
solver as in [17, 47] (which are generally too slow), we use a custom algorithm. We now discuss
each of these design decisions in detail.
V eriF low’s first job is to track every forwarding-state change event. For example, in an SDN
such as OpenFlow [51], a centralized controller issues forwarding rules to the network devices to
handle flows initiated by users. V eriF low must intercept all these rules and verify them before
they reach the network. To achieve this goal, V eriF low is implemented as a shim layer between
the controller and the network, and monitors all communication in either direction.
For every rule insertion/deletion message, V eriF low must verify the effect of the rule on the
network at very high speed. V eriF low cannot leverage techniques used by past work [16, 40, 47],
because these operate at timescales of seconds to hours. Unlike previous solutions, we do not want
to check the entire network on each change. We solve this problem in three steps. First, using
the new rule and any overlapping existing rules, we slice the network into a set of equivalence
classes (ECs) of packets (§ 2.2.1). Each EC is a set of packets that experience the same forwarding
actions throughout the network. Intuitively, each change to the network will typically only affect
a very small number of ECs (see § 2.4.1). Therefore, we find the set of ECs whose operation could
be altered by a rule, and verify network invariants only within those classes. Second, V eriF low
builds individual forwarding graphs for every modified EC, representing the network’s forwarding
behavior (§ 2.2.2). Third, V eriF low traverses these graphs (or runs custom user-defined code) to
determine the status of one or more invariants (§ 2.2.3). The following subsections describe these
steps in detail. Figure 2.1 shows the placement and operations of V eriF low in an SDN.
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Figure 2.1: V eriF low sits between the SDN applications and devices to intercept and check every
rule entering the network.
2.2.1 Slicing the network into equivalence classes
One way to verify network properties is to prepare a model of the entire network using its
current data-plane state, and run queries on this model [16, 47]. However, checking the entire
network’s state every time a new flow rule is inserted is wasteful, and fails to provide real-time
response. Instead, we note that most forwarding rule changes affect only a small subset of all
possible packets. For example, inserting a longest-prefix-match rule for the destination IP field
will only affect forwarding for packets destined to that prefix. In order to confine our verification
activities to only the affected set of packets, we slice the network into a set of equivalence classes
(ECs) based on the new rule and the existing rules that overlap with the new rule. An equivalence
class is defined as follows.
Definition (Equivalence Class): An equivalence class (EC) is a set P of packets such that
for any p1, p2 ∈ P and any network device R, the forwarding action is identical for p1 and p2 at R.
Separating the entire packet space into individual ECs allows V eriF low to pinpoint the affected
set of packets if a problem is discovered while verifying a newly inserted forwarding rule.
Let us look at an example. Consider an OpenFlow switch with two rules matching packets with
destination IP address prefixes 11.1.0.0/16 and 12.1.0.0/16, respectively. If a new rule matching
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destination IP address prefix 11.0.0.0/8 is added, it may affect packets belonging to the 11.1.0.0/16
range depending on the rules’ priority values [11] (the longer prefix may not have higher priority).
However, the new rule will not affect packets outside the range 11.0.0.0/8, such as 12.1.0.0/16.
Therefore, V eriF low will only consider the new rule (11.0.0.0/8) and the existing overlapping rule
(11.1.0.0/16) while analyzing network properties. These two overlapping rules produce three ECs
(represented using the lower and upper bound range values of the destination IP address field):
11.0.0.0 to 11.0.255.255, 11.1.0.0 to 11.1.255.255, and 11.2.255.255 to 11.255.255.255.
V eriF low needs an efficient data structure to quickly store new network rules, find overlapping
rules, and compute the affected ECs. For this we utilize a multi-dimensional prefix tree (trie)
inspired by traditional packet classification algorithms [68].
A trie is an ordered tree data structure that stores an associative array. In our case, the trie
associates the set of packets matched by a forwarding rule with the forwarding rule itself. Each
level in the trie corresponds to a specific bit in a forwarding rule (equivalently, a bit in the packet
header). Each node in our trie has three branches, corresponding to three possible values that
the rule can match: 0, 1, and * (wildcard). The trie can be seen as a composition of several
sub-tries or dimensions, each corresponding to a packet header field. We maintain a sub-trie in
our multi-dimensional trie for each of the mandatory match and packet header fields supported by
OpenFlow 1.1.0.2 (Note that an optimization in our implementation uses a condensed set of fields
in the trie; see § 2.3.2.) For example, the sub-trie representing the IPv4 destination corresponds
to 32 levels in the trie. One of the sub-tries (DL SRC in our design) appears at the top, the next
field’s sub-tries are attached to the leaves of the first, and so on (Figure 2.2). A path from the
trie’s root to a leaf of one of the bottommost sub-tries thus represents the set of packets that a rule
matches. Each leaf stores the rules that match that set of packets, and the devices at which they
are located (Figure 2.2).
When a new forwarding rule is generated by the application, we perform a lookup in our trie,
by traversing it dimension by dimension to find all the rules that intersect the new rule. At each
dimension, we narrow down the search area by only traversing those branches that fall within the
range of the new rule using the field value of that particular dimension. The lookup procedure
2(DL SRC, DL DST, NW SRC, NW DST, IN PORT, DL VLAN, DL VLAN PCP, DL TYPE, NW TOS,
NW PROTO, TP SRC, TP DST, MPLS LABEL and MPLS TC).
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Figure 2.2: V eriF low’s core algorithmic process.
results in the selection of a set of leaves of the bottommost dimension, each with a set of forwarding
rules. These rules collectively define a set of packets (in particular, their corresponding forwarding
rules) that could be affected by the incoming forwarding rule. This set may span multiple ECs.
We next compute the individual ECs as illustrated in Figure 2.2. For each field, we find a set of
disjoint ranges (lower and upper bound) such that no rule splits one of the ranges. An EC is then
defined by a particular choice of one of the ranges for each of the fields. This is not necessarily a
minimal set of ECs; for example, ECs 2 and 4 in Figure 2.2 could have been combined into a single
EC. However, this method performs well in practice.
2.2.2 Modeling forwarding state with forwarding graphs
For each EC computed in the previous step, V eriF low generates a forwarding graph. Each such
graph is a representation of how packets within an EC will be forwarded through the network. In
the graph, a node represents an EC at a particular network device, and a directed edge represents
a forwarding decision for a particular (EC, device) pair. Specifically, an edge X → Y indicates that
according to the forwarding table at node X, packets within this EC are forwarded to Y . To build
the graph for each EC, we traverse our trie a second time to find the devices and rules that match
packets from that EC. The second traversal is needed to find all those rules that were not necessary
to compute the affected ECs in the first traversal, yet can still influence their forwarding behavior.
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For example, for a new rule with 10.0.0.0/8 specified as the destination prefix, an existing 0.0.0.0/0
rule will not contribute to the generation of the affected ECs, but may influence their forwarding
behavior depending on its priority. Given the range values of different fields of an EC, looking up
matching rules from the trie structure can be performed very quickly. Here, V eriF low only has to
traverse those branches of the trie having rules that can match packets of that particular EC.
2.2.3 Running queries
Above, we described how V eriF low models the behavior of the network using forwarding
graphs, building forwarding graphs only for those equivalence classes (ECs) whose behavior may
have changed. Next, we answer queries (check invariants) using this model.
V eriF low maintains a list of invariants to be checked. When ECs have been modified, V eriF low
checks each (invariant, modified EC) pair. An invariant is specified as a verification function that
takes as input the forwarding graph for a specific EC, performs arbitrary computation, and can
trigger resulting actions. V eriF low exposes an API (Application Programming Interface), the
implementation of which is described in § 2.3.3, so that new invariants can be written and plugged
in.
Up to a certain level of detail, the forwarding graph is an exact representation of the forwarding
behavior of the network. Therefore, invariant modules can check a large diversity of conditions
concerning network behavior. For example:
• Basic reachability: The verification function traverses the directed edges in the forwarding
graph (using depth-first search in our implementation) to determine whether packets will be
delivered to the destination address specified in the rule.
• Loop-freeness: The verification function traverses the given EC’s forwarding graph to check
that it does not contain a loop.
• Consistency: Given two (pre-specified) routers R1, R2 that are intended to have identical
forwarding operations, the verification function traverses the forwarding graph starting at R1
and R2 to test whether the fate of packets is the same in both cases. (Any difference may
indicate a bug.)
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Further examples include detecting “black holes” where packets are dropped, ensuring isolation
of multiple VLANs, verifying access control policies, checking whether a new rule conflicts with an
existing rule, checking whether an EC changes its next hop due to the insertion/deletion of a rule,
ensuring that packets always traverse a firewall, and so on.
There are two key limitations on what invariants can be feasibly implemented. First,
V eriF low’s forwarding graph construct must include the necessary information. Our current im-
plementation of V eriF low does not, for example, incorporate information on buffer sizes that would
be necessary for certain performance invariants. (There is not, however, any fundamental reason
that V eriF low could not be augmented with such metadata.) Second, the invariant check must
be implementable in the incremental manner described above where only the modified ECs are
considered at each step.
If a verification function finds a violated invariant, it can choose to trigger further actions within
V eriF low. Two obvious actions are dropping the rule that was being inserted into the network, or
installing the rule but generating an alarm for the operator. For example, the operator could choose
to drop rules that cause a security violation (such as packets leaking onto a protected VLAN), but
only generate an alarm for a black hole. Since verification functions are arbitrary code, they may
take other actions as well, such as maintaining statistics (e.g., rate of forwarding behavior change)
or writing logs.
2.2.4 Dealing with high verification time
V eriF low achieves real-time response by confining its verification activities within those parts of
the network that are affected when a new forwarding rule is installed. In general, the effectiveness
of this approach will be determined by numerous factors, such as the complexity of verification
functions, the size of the network, the number of rules in the network, the number of unique ECs
covered by a new rule, the number of header fields used to match packets by a new rule, and so on.
However, perhaps the most important factor summarizing verification time is the number of
ECs modified. As our later experiments will show, V eriF low’s verification time is roughly linear in
this number. In other words, V eriF low has difficulty verifying invariants in real-time when large
swaths of the network’s forwarding behavior are altered in one operation.
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When such disruptive events occur, V eriF low may need to let new rules be installed in the
network without waiting for verification, and run the verification process in parallel. We lose the
ability to block problematic rules before they enter the network, but we note several mitigating
facts. First, the most prominent example of a disruptive event affecting many ECs is a link
failure, in which case V eriF low anyway cannot block the modification from entering the network.
Second, upon (eventually) detecting a problem, V eriF low can still raise an alarm and remove the
problematic rule(s) from the network. Third, the fact that the number of affected ECs is large may
itself be worthy of an immediate alarm even before invariants are checked for each EC. Finally, our
experiments with realistic forwarding rule update traces (§ 2.4) show that disruptive events (i.e.,
events affecting large number of ECs) are rare: in the vast majority of cases (around 99%), the
number of affected ECs is small (less than 10).
2.2.5 Alternative BDD-based design
To show the feasibility of this approach, we also studied a BDD-based network verification
approach for comparison.
Representing OpenFlow rules as BDDs
The insight behind the BDD-based approach is that network forwarding behavior can be ex-
pressed as a boolean function, where variables represent the network’s inputs (the location and
packet contents injected into the network), the function’s result represents the network’s outputs
(the location and packet contents sent out from the network), and the function’s form represents
packet forwarding behavior within the network (e.g., which packets are filtered/modified, and which
paths they are sent on). As BDDs can be used to represent arbitrary boolean functions, to express
the network as a BDD, we used similar techniques as used in [17]. We consider each bit of the
packet header, which are used for rule matching, as individual variables in the BDD and build
boolean functions using them to represent the forwarding behavior of a particular device. In order
to limit the size of the model, once the set of affected rules of a network update are found, we
generate a BDD corresponding to them.







(a) Network topology (b) Forwarding table at router RA
(c) Boolean functions representing the forwarding table
Figure 2.3: Representing forwarding table information as boolean functions.
three routers and two hosts. Figure 2.3b shows the forwarding table (Forwarding Information Base
or FIB) of router RA. This FIB contains the forwarding information to reach hosts HA and HB.
Boolean functions corresponding to the forwarding behavior of RA are shown in Figure 2.3c. At
RA, if a packet arrived with destination address of HA, it will be forwarded to RB. Therefore,
we AND the address representing HA with the address of RB (1). Similar action will be taken
for packets destined to HB (via RC) (2). Now, we OR these two expressions as a packet can be
destined to either of these two hosts (3). Here, for simplicity we assume that packets are sent only
to these two hosts. Finally, these actions will be taken whenever a packet is at RA. Therefore, we
AND the address of RA with the expression obtained in step 3 (4). Step 4 in Figure 2.3c represents
the boolean function that represents the FIB state of a single router (RA in this example). As a
packet can be present at any one router at a particular time while it is present in the network,
we OR together individual routers’ FIB boolean functions to get the boolean function representing
the entire network’s state at a given moment.
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Checking invariants
The next step is to check different network properties by running queries on the BDD built in
the previous step. Given a particular state of the network and a set of new rules, we are interested
to know whether inserting these rules will violate any network invariant or not. Therefore, we look
for instances of packets that may fall into routing loops or may experience black holes. We express
these queries as Computation Tree Logic (CTL) formulas as CTL provides a nice and compact way
to explore states of a system represented as a finite state machine. We use standard CTL operator
(EX, AX, AF, etc.) to express different network invariants that we are interested to check [17], and
run the resulting query on the BDD structure built from network forwarding state. The results of
these queries give us indications of potential violation of key network invariants and examples of
packet instances that may cause an invariant to fail.
2.3 Implementation
We describe three key aspects of our implementation: our shim layer to intercept network events
(§ 2.3.1), an optimization to accelerate verification (§ 2.3.2), and our API for custom invariants
(§ 2.3.3). In addition to the prototype of V eriF low, we also implemented a BDD-based design
(§ 2.2.5) for comparison purpose.
2.3.1 Making deployment transparent
In order to ease the deployment of V eriF low in networks with OpenFlow-enabled devices,
and to use V eriF low with unmodified OpenFlow applications, we need a mechanism to make
V eriF low transparent so that these existing OpenFlow entities may remain unaware of the presence
of V eriF low. We built two versions of V eriF low. One is a proxy process [65] that sits between
the controller and the network, and is therefore independent of the particular controller. The
second version is integrated with the NOX OpenFlow controller [29] to improve performance; our
performance evaluation is of this version. We expect one could similarly integrate V eriF low with
other controllers, such as Floodlight [5], Beacon [3] and Maestro [21], without significant trouble.
We built our implementation within NOX version 0.9.1 (full beta single-thread version). We
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integrated V eriF low within NOX, enabling it to run as a transparent rule verifier sitting between
the OpenFlow applications implemented using NOX’s API, and the switches and routers in the
network. SDN applications running on NOX use the NOX API to manipulate the forwarding state
of the network, resulting in OFPT FLOW MOD (flow table modification) and other OpenFlow
messages generated by NOX. We modified NOX to intercept these messages, and redirect them to
our V eriF low module. This ensures that all messages are intercepted by V eriF low before they
are dispatched to the network. V eriF low then processes and checks the forwarding rules contained
in these messages for correctness, and can block problematic flow rules.
To integrate the V eriF low module, we extend two parts of NOX. First, within the core of
NOX, the send openflow command() interface is responsible for adding (relaying) flow rules from
OpenFlow applications to the switches. At the lower layers of NOX, handle flow removed() handles
events that remove rules from switches, due to rule timeouts or commands sent by applications.
Our implementation intercepts all messages sent to these two function calls, and redirects them
to V eriF low. To reduce memory usage and improve running time, we pass these messages via
shallow copy.
There are five types of flow table modification messages that can be generated by Open-
Flow applications: OFPFC ADD, OFPFC MODIFY STRICT, OFPFC DELETE STRICT, OF-
PFC MODIFY and OFPFC DELETE. These rules differ in terms of whether they add, modify or
delete a rule from the flow table. The strict versions match all the fields bit by bit, whereas the
non-strict versions allow wildcards. Our implementation handles all these message types appropri-
ately.
2.3.2 Optimizing the verification process
We use an optimization technique that exploits the way certain match and packet header fields
are handled in the OpenFlow 1.1.0 specification. 10 out of 14 fields in this specification do not
support arbitrary wildcards.3 One can only specify an exact value or the special ANY (wildcard)
value in these fields. We do not use separate dimensions in our trie to represent these fields,
because we do not need to find multiple overlapping ranges for them. Therefore, we only maintain
3IN PORT, DL VLAN, DL VLAN PCP, DL TYPE, NW TOS, NW PROTO, TP SRC, TP DST, MPLS LABEL
and MPLS TC.
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the trie structure for the other four fields (DL SRC, DL DST, NW SRC and NW DST). Due to
this change, we generate the set of affected equivalence classes (ECs) in three steps. First, we use
the trie structure to look for network-wide overlapping rules, and find the set of affected packets
determined by the four fields that are represented by the trie. Each individual packet set we get
from this step is actually a set of ECs that can be distinguished by the other 10 fields. Second, for
each of these packet sets, we extract all the rules that can match packets of that particular class
from the location/device of the newly inserted rule. We linearly go through all these rules to find
non-overlapping range values for the rest of the fields that are not maintained in the trie structure.
Thus, each packet set found in the first step breaks into multiple finer packet sets spanning all the
14 mandatory OpenFlow match and packet header fields. Note that in this step we only consider
the rules present at the device of the newly inserted rule. Therefore, in the final step, as we traverse
the forwarding graphs, we may encounter finer rules at other devices that will generate new packet
sets with finer granularity. We handle them by maintaining sets of excluded packets as described
in the next paragraph.
Each forwarding graph that we generate using our trie structure represents the forwarding state
of a group of packet sets that can be distinguished using the 10 fields that do not support arbitrary
wildcards. Therefore, while traversing the forwarding graphs, we only work on those rules that
overlap with the newly inserted rule on these 10 fields. As we move from node to node while
traversing these graphs, we keep track of the ECs that have been served by finer rules and are no
longer present in the primary packet set that was generated in the first place. For example, in a
device, a subset of a packet set may be served by a finer rule having higher priority than a coarser
rule that serves the rest of that packet set. We handle this by maintaining a set of excluded packets
for each forwarding action. Therefore, whenever we reach a node that answers a query (e.g., found
a loop or reached a destination), the primary packet set minus the set of excluded packets gives
the set of packets that experiences the result of the query.
2.3.3 API to write general queries
We expose a set of functions that can be used to write general queries in C++. Below is a list
of these functions along with the required parameters.
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GetAffectedEquivalenceClasses: Given a new rule, this function computes the set of affected
ECs, and returns them. It also returns a set of sub-tries from the last dimension of our trie
structure. Each sub-trie holds the rules that can match packets belonging to one of the affected
ECs. This information can be used to build the forwarding graphs of those ECs. This function
takes the following parameters.
- Rule: A newly inserted rule.
- Returns: Affected ECs.
- Returns: Sub-tries representing the last dimension, and holding rules that can match packets of
the affected ECs.
GetForwardingGraph: This function generates and returns the forwarding graph for a partic-
ular EC. It takes the following parameters.
- EquivalenceClass: An EC whose forwarding graph will be computed.
- TrieSet: Sub-tries representing the last dimension, and holding rules that match the EC supplied
as the first argument.
- Returns: Corresponding forwarding graph.
ProcessCurrentHop: This function allows the user to traverse a forwarding graph in a custom
manner. Given a location and EC, it returns the corresponding next hop. It handles the generation
of multiple finer packet sets by computing excluded packet sets that need to be maintained because
of our optimization strategy (§ 2.3.2). Due to this optimization, this function returns a set of (next
hop, excluded packet set) tuples — effectively, an annotated directed edge in the forwarding graph.
With repeated calls to this function across nodes in the forwarding graphs, custom invariant-
checking modules can traverse the forwarding graph and perform arbitrary computation on its
structure. This function takes the following parameters.
- ForwardingGraph: The forwarding graph of an EC.
- Location: The current location of the EC.
- Returns: (Next hop, excluded packet set) tuples.
Let us look at an example that shows how this API can be used in practice. A network operator
may want to ensure that packets belonging to a certain set always pass through a firewall device.
This invariant can be violated during addition/deletion of rules, or during link up/down events. To
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check this invariant, the network operator can extend V eriF low using the above API to incorporate
a custom query algorithm that generates an alarm when the packet set under scrutiny bypasses
the firewall device. In fact, the network operator can implement any query that can be answered
using the information present in the forwarding graphs.
2.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present a performance evaluation of our V eriF low implementation. As
V eriF low intercepts every rule insertion message whenever it is issued by an SDN controller, it is
crucial to complete the verification process in real time so that network performance is not affected,
and to ensure scalability of the controller. We evaluated the overhead of V eriF low’s operations
with the help of two experiments. In the first experiment (§ 2.4.1), our goal is to microbenchmark
different phases of V eriF low’s operations and observe their contribution to the overall running
time. The goal of the second experiment (§ 2.4.2) is to assess the impact of V eriF low on TCP
connection setup latency and throughput as perceived by end users of an SDN.
In all of our experiments, we used our basic reachability algorithms to test for loops and black
holes for every flow modification message that was sent to the network. All of our experiments
were performed on a Dell Optiplex 9010 machine with an Intel Core i7 3770 CPU with 4 physical
cores and 8 threads at 3.4 GHz, and 32 GB of RAM, running 64 bit Ubuntu Linux 11.10.
2.4.1 Per-update processing time
In this experiment, we simulated a network consisting of 172 routers following a Rocketfuel [12]
topology (AS 1755), and replayed BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) RIB (Routing Information
Base) and update traces collected from the Route Views Project [15]. We built an OSPF (Open
Shortest Path First) simulator to compute the IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol) path cost between
every pair of routers in the network. A BGP RIB snapshot consisting of 5 million entries was
used to initialize the routers’ FIB (Forwarding Information Base) tables. Only the FIBs of the
border routers were initialized in this phase. We randomly mapped Route Views peers to border
routers in our network, and then replayed RIB and update traces so that they originate according
to this mapping. We replayed a BGP update trace containing 90,000 updates to trigger dynamic
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changes in the network. Upon receiving an update from the neighboring AS, each border router
sends the update to all the other routers in the network. Using standard BGP polices, each router
updates its RIB using the information present in the update, and updates its FIB based on BGP
AS path length and IGP path cost. We fed all the FIB changes into V eriF low to measure the
time V eriF low takes to complete its individual steps described in § 2.2. We recorded the run time
to process each change individually. Note that in this first set of experiments, only the destination
IP address is used to forward packets. Therefore, only this one field contributes to the generation
of equivalence classes (ECs). We initialize the other fields with ANY (wildcards).
The results from this experiment are shown in Figure 2.4(a). V eriF low is able to verify most
of the updates within 1 millisecond (ms), with mean verification time of 0.38ms. Moreover, of this
time, the query phase takes only 0.01ms on an average, demonstrating the value of reducing the
query problem to a simple graph traversal for each EC. Therefore, V eriF low would be able to run
multiple queries of interest to the network operator (e.g., black hole detection, isolation of multiple
VLANs, etc.) within a millisecond time budget.
We found that the number of ECs that are affected by a new rule strongly influences verification
time. The scatter plot of Figure 2.4(b) shows one data point for each observed number of modified
ECs (showing the mean verification time across all rules, which modified that number of ECs).
The largest number of ECs affected by a single rule was 574; the largest verification latency was
159.2ms due to an update affecting 511 ECs. However, in this experiment, we found that for most
updates the number of affected ECs is small. 94.5% of the updates only affected a single EC, and
99.1% affected less than 10 ECs. Therefore, only a small fraction of rules (0.9%) affected large
numbers of ECs. This can be observed by looking at the long tail of Figure 2.4(a).
In the above experiment, we assumed that the network topology remains unchanged, i.e., there
are no link or node failures. In case of a link failure or node failure (which can be thought of as
failure of multiple links connected to the failed node), the packets that were using that link or
node will experience changes in their forwarding behavior. When this happens, V eriF low’s job is
to verify the fate of those affected packets. In order to evaluate V eriF low’s performance in this
scenario, we used the above topology and traces to run a new experiment. In this experiment,
we fed both the BGP RIB trace and update trace to the network. Then we removed each of the
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packet-carrying links (381 in total) of the network one by one (restoring a removed link before
removing the next), and computed the number of affected ECs and the running time of V eriF low
to verify the behavior of those classes. We found that most of the link removals affected a large
number of ECs. 254 out of 381 links affected more that 1,000 ECs. The mean verification time to
verify a link failure event was 1.15 seconds, with a maximum of 4.05 seconds. We can deal with
such cases by processing the forwarding graphs of different ECs in parallel on multi-core processors.
This is possible because the forwarding graphs do not depend on each other, or on any shared data
structure. However, as link or node failures cannot be avoided once they happen, this may not be
a serious issue for network operators.
In order to evaluate V eriF low’s performance in the presence of more fields, we changed the
input data set to add packet filters that will selectively drop packets after matching them against
multiple fields. We randomly selected a subset of the existing RIB rules currently present in the
network, and inserted packet filter rules by specifying values in some of the other fields that were
not present in the original trace. We ran this experiment with two sets of fields. In the first set we
used TP SRC and TP DST in addition to NW DST (3 fields in total), which was already present in
the trace. For each randomly selected RIB rule, we set random values to those two fields (TP SRC
and TP DST), and set its priority higher than the original rule. The remaining 11 fields are set to
ANY. While replaying the updates, all the 14 fields except NW DST are set to ANY.
In the second set we used NW SRC, IN PORT, DL VLAN, TP SRC and TP DST in addition
to NW DST (6 fields in total). For each randomly selected RIB rule, we set random values to
IN PORT, DL VLAN, TP SRC and TP DST, a random /16 value in NW SRC, and set the priority
higher than the original rule. The remaining 8 fields are set to ANY. While replaying the updates,
all the 14 fields except NW SRC and NW DST are set to ANY. In the updates, the NW SRC is
set to a random /12 value and the NW DST is the original value present in the trace. We ran this
experiment multiple times varying the percentage of RIB rules that are used to generate random
filter rules with higher priority.
Figure 2.4(c) shows the results of this experiment. Verification time is heavily affected by the
number of fields used to classify packets. This happens because as we use more fields to classify
packets at finer granularities, more unique ECs are generated, and hence more forwarding graphs
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need to be verified. We also note from Figure 2.4(c) that V eriF low’s overall performance is not
affected much by the number of filters that we install into the network.
In all our experiments thus far, we kept a fixed order of packet header fields in our trie structure.
We started with DL SRC (DS), followed by DL DST (DD), NW SRC (NS) and NW DST (ND).
In order to evaluate the performance of V eriF low with different field orderings, we re-ran the
above packet filter experiment with reordered fields. In all the runs we used random values for
the NW SRC field and used the NW DST values present in the Route Views traces. All the other
fields were set to ANY. We installed random packet filter rules for 10% of the BGP RIB entries.
As our dataset only specified values for the NW SRC and NW DST fields, there were a total of 12
different orderings of the aforementioned 4 fields. Table 2.1 shows the results from this experiment.
Table 2.1: Effect of different field orderings on total running time of V eriF low.
Order Time (ms) Order Time (ms)
DS-DD-NS-ND 1.001 DS-DD-ND-NS 0.090
DS-NS-DD-ND 1.057 DS-ND-DD-NS 0.096
NS-DS-DD-ND 1.144 ND-DS-DD-NS 0.101
NS-DS-ND-DD 1.213 ND-DS-NS-DD 0.103
NS-ND-DS-DD 1.254 ND-NS-DS-DD 0.15
DS-NS-ND-DD 1.116 DS-ND-NS-DD 0.098
From Table 2.1, we can see that changing the field order in the trie structure greatly influences
the running time of V eriF low. Putting the NW DST field ahead of NW SRC reduced the running
time by an order of magnitude (from around 1ms to around 0.1ms). This happens because a
particular field order may produce fewer unique ECs compared to other field orderings for the same
rule. However, it is difficult to come up with a single field order that works best in all scenarios,
because it is highly dependent on the type of rules present in a particular network. Changing the
field order in the trie structure dynamically and efficiently as the network state evolves would be
an interesting area for future work.
Checking non-reachability invariants: Most of our discussion thus far focused on checking
invariants associated with the inter-reachability of network devices. To evaluate the generality of
our tool, we implemented two more invariants using our API that were not directly related to
reachability: conflict detection (whether the newly inserted rule violates isolation of flow tables
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between network slices, accomplished by checking the output of the EC search phase), and k-
monitoring (ensuring that all paths in the network traverse one of several deployed monitoring
points, done by augmenting the forwarding graph traversal process). We found that the overhead
of these checks was minimal. For the conflict detection query, we ran the above filtering experiment
using the 6-field set with 10% and 20% newly inserted random rules. However, this time instead
of checking the reachability of the affected ECs as each update is replayed, we only computed the
set of rules that overlap/conflict with the newly inserted rule. The results from this experiment
are shown in Figure 2.4(d).
From this figure, we can see that conflicting rule checking can be done quickly, taking only
0.305ms on average. (The step in the CDF is due to the fact that some withdrawal rules did not
overlap with any existing rule.)
For the k-monitoring query experiment, we used a snapshot of the Stanford backbone network
data-plane state that was used in [40]. This network consists of 16 routers, where 14 of these
are internal routers and the other 2 are gateway routers used to access the outside network. The
snapshot contains 7,213 FIB table entries in total. In this experiment, we used V eriF low to test
whether all the ECs currently present in the network pass through one of the two gateway routers
of the network. We observed that at each location the average latency to perform this check for all
the ECs is around 68.06ms with a maximum of 75.39ms.
2.4.2 Effect on network performance
In order to evaluate the effect of V eriF low’s operations on user-perceived TCP connection setup
latency and the network throughput, we emulated an OpenFlow network consisting of 172 switches
following the aforementioned Rocketfuel topology using Mininet [7]. Mininet creates a software-
defined network (SDN) with multiple nodes on a single machine. We connected one host to every
switch in this emulated network. We ran the NOX OpenFlow controller along with an application
that provides the functionality of a learning switch. It allows a host to reach any other host in
the network by installing flow rules in the switches using flow modification (Flow Mod) messages.
We implemented a simple TCP server program and a simple TCP client program to drive the
experiment. The server program accepts TCP connections from clients and closes the connection
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immediately. The client program consists of two threads. The primary thread continuously sends
connect requests to a random server using a non-blocking socket. To vary the intensity of the
workload, our TCP client program generates connections periodically with a parameterized sleep
interval (S). The primary thread at each client sleeps for a random interval between 0 to S seconds
(at microsecond granularity) before initiating the connection request, and iterating. The secondary
thread at each client uses the select function to look for connections that are ready for transmission
or experienced an error. A user supplied polling interval (P ) is used to control the rate at which
the select call will return. We set P inversely proportional to the S value to avoid busy waiting
and to allow the other processes (e.g., Open vSwitch [10]) to get a good share of the CPU. We ran
the server program at each of the 172 hosts, and configured the client programs at all the hosts to
continually connect to the server of random hosts (excluding itself) over a particular duration (at
least 10 minutes). In the switch application, we set the rule eviction idle timeout to 1 second and
hard timeout to 5 seconds.
We ran this experiment first with NOX alone, and then with NOX and V eriF low. We used
the same seed in all the random number generators to ensure similar loads in both the runs. We
also varied the S value to monitor the performance of V eriF low under a range of network loads.
Figure 2.5(a) shows the number of TCP connections that were successfully completed per
second for different workloads both with and without V eriF low. From this figure, we can see that
in all the cases V eriF low imposes negligible overhead on the TCP connection setup throughput
in our emulated OpenFlow network. The largest reduction in throughput that we observed in our
experiments was only 0.74%.
Figure 2.5(b) shows the number of flow modification (Flow Mod) messages that were processed
and sent to the network per second for different workloads both with and without V eriF low. From
this figure, again we can see that in all the cases V eriF low imposes minimal overhead on the flow
modification message throughput. The largest reduction in throughput that we observed in our
experiments was only 12.8%. This reduction in throughput is caused by the additional processing
time required to verify the flow modification messages before they are sent to the network.
In order to assess the impact of V eriF low on end-to-end TCP connection setup latency, we
ran this experiment with S set to 30 seconds. We found that in the presence of V eriF low, the
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average TCP connection setup latency increases by 15.5% (45.58ms without V eriF low versus
52.63ms with V eriF low). As setting up a TCP connection between two hosts in our emulated 172
host OpenFlow network requires installing flow rules into more than one switch, the verification
performed by V eriF low after receiving each flow rule from the controller inflates the end-to-end
connection setup latency to some extent.
Lastly, we ran this experiment after modifying V eriF low to work with different numbers of
OpenFlow packet header fields. Clearly, if we restrict the number of fields during the verifica-
tion process, there will be less work for V eriF low, resulting in faster verification time. In this
experiment, we gradually increased the number of OpenFlow packet header fields that were used
during the verification process (from 1 to 14). V eriF low simply ignored the excluded fields, and it
reduced the number of dimensions in our trie structure. We set S to 10 seconds and ran each run
for 10 minutes. During the runs, we measured the verification latency experienced by each flow
modification message generated by NOX, and computed their average at each run.
Figure 2.5(c) shows the results from this experiment. Here, we see that with the increase in
the number of packet header fields, the verification overhead of V eriF low increases gradually but
always remains low enough to ensure real-time response. The 5 fields that contributed most in the
verification overhead are DL SRC, DL DST, NW SRC, NW DST and DL TYPE. This happened
because these 5 fields had different values at different flow rules, and contributed most in the
generation of multiple ECs. The other fields were mostly wildcards, and did not generate additional
ECs.
2.4.3 Comparison with related work
Finally, we compared performance of our technique with two pieces of related work: the Hassel
tool presented in [40] (provided to us by the authors), and a BDD-based analysis tool (as described
in § 2.2.5) that we implemented from scratch following the strategy presented in [17] (the original
code was not available to us). The authors of [40] provided two copies of their tool, one in Python
and one in C, and we evaluated using the better-performing C version. While we note these works
solve different problems from our work (e.g., HSA performs static verification, and does it between
port pairs), we present these results to put V eriF low’s performance in context. First, we ran
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Hassel over the snapshot of the Stanford backbone network data-plane state that was used in [40].
We found that Hassel’s average time to check reachability between a pair of ports (effectively
exploring all ECs for that source-destination pair) was 578.62ms, with a maximum of 6.24 seconds.
In comparison, V eriF low took only 68.06ms on average (with a maximum of 75.39ms) to test
the reachability of all the ECs currently present at a single node in the network. Next, in the
BDD-based approach, we used the NuSMV [9] model checker to build a BDD using a new rule
and the overlapping existing rules, and used CTL (Computation Tree Logic) to run reachability
queries [17]. Here, we used the Rocketfuel topology and Route Views traces that we used in our
earlier experiments. We found that this approach is quite slow and does not provide real-time
response while inserting and checking new forwarding rules. Checking an update took 335.71ms on
an average with a maximum of 67.16 seconds.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented V eriF low, a network debugging tool to find faulty rules issued by
SDN applications, and optionally prevent them from reaching the network and causing anomalous
network behavior. V eriF low leverages a set of efficient algorithms to check rule modification events
in real time before they are sent to the live network. To the best of our knowledge, V eriF low is
the first tool that can verify network-wide invariants in a live network in real time. With the help
of experiments using a real world network topology, real world traces, and an emulated OpenFlow




































































































Figure 2.4: Per-update processing times: (a) Microbenchmark results, using the Route Views
trace. Total verification time of V eriF low remained below 1ms for 97.8% of the updates. (b)
Scatter plot showing the influence of number of equivalence classes on verification time. (c) Results
from multi-field packet filter experiment using the Route Views trace. As more fields are used
in forwarding rules, the running time of V eriF low increases. The average verification latency is
not significantly influenced as we increase the number of filters present in the network. (d) Results
from the conflict detection test. V eriF low is fast enough to compute all the conflicting rules within














































































































Figure 2.5: Effect on network performance: (a) TCP connection setup throughput, and (b)
Throughput of flow modification (Flow Mod) messages, with and without V eriF low. For different
loads, V eriF low imposes minimal overhead. (c) Effect of the number of packet header fields on




Synthesizing Update Timing and
Ordering
Network operators often establish a set of correctness conditions to ensure successful operation
of the network, such as the preference of one path over another, the prevention of untrusted traffic
from entering a secure zone, or loop and black hole avoidance. As networks become an increasingly
crucial backbone for critical services, the ability to construct networks that obey correctness criteria
is becoming even more important. Moreover, as modern networks are continually changing, it is
critical for them to be correct even during transitions. Thus, a key challenge is to guarantee
that properties are preserved during transitions from one correct configuration to a new correct
configuration, which has been referred as network consistency [63].
Several recent proposed systems [34, 38, 45, 63] consistently update software-defined networks
(SDNs), transitioning between two operator-specified network snapshots. However, those methods
maintain only specific properties, and can substantially delay the network update process. Con-
sistent updates [63] (CU), for example, only guarantees coherence: during a network update any
packet or any flow is processed by either a new or an old configuration, but never by a mix of the
two. This is a relatively strong policy that is sufficient to guarantee a large class of more specific
policies (no loop, firewall traversal, etc.), but it comes at the cost of requiring a two-phase update
mechanism that incurs substantial delay between the two phases and doubles flow entries tem-
porarily. For networks that care only about a weaker consistency property, e.g., only loop freedom,
this overhead is unnecessary. At the same time, networks sometimes need properties beyond what
CU provides: CU only enforces properties on individual flows, but not across flows (e.g., “no more
than two flows on a particular link”). SWAN [34] and zUpdate [45] also ensure only a specific
property, in their case congestion freedom.
That leads to a question: is it possible to efficiently maintain customizable correctness policies
as the network evolves? Ideally, we want the “best of both worlds”: the efficiency of simply
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immediately installing updates without delay, but the safety of whatever correctness properties are
relevant to the network at hand.
We are not the first to define this goal. Recently, Dionysus [36] proposed to reduce network
update time to just what is necessary to satisfy a certain property. However, Dionysus requires
a rule dependency graph for each particular invariant, produced by an algorithm specific to that
invariant (the paper presents an algorithm for packet coherence). For example, a waypointing
invariant would need a new algorithm. Furthermore, the algorithms work only when forwarding
rules match exactly one flow.
We take a different approach that begins with an observation: synthesizing consistent updates
for arbitrary consistency policies is hard, but network verification on general policies is compara-
tively easy, especially now that real-time data plane verification tools [16, 39, 43] can verify very
generic data-plane properties of a network state within milliseconds. In fact, as also occurs in
domains outside of networking, there is a connection between synthesis and verification. A feasible
update sequence is one which the relevant properties are verifiable at each moment in time. Might
a verifier serve as a guide through the search space of possible update sequences?
Based on that insight, we propose the design of one synthesis component in our system, the
Customizable Consistency Generator (CCG), which efficiently and consistently updates SDNs un-
der customizable properties (invariants), intuitively by converting the scheduling synthesis problem
to a series of network verification problems. With CCG, network programmers can express de-
sired invariants using an interface (from [43]) which allows invariants to be defined as essentially
arbitrary functions of a data plane snapshot, generally requiring only a few tens of lines of code to
inspect the network model. Next, CCG runs a greedy algorithm: when a new rule arrives from the
SDN controller, CCG checks whether the network would satisfy the desired invariants if the rule
were applied. If so, the rule is sent without delay; otherwise, it is buffered, and at each step CCG
checks its buffer to see if any rules can be installed safely (via repeated verifications).
This simplistic algorithm has two key problems. First, the greedy algorithm may not find the
best (e.g., fastest) update installation sequence, and even worse, it may get stuck with no update
being installable without violating an invariant. However, we identify a fairly large scope of policies
that are “segment-independent” for which the heuristic is guaranteed to succeed without deadlock
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(§3.4.2). For non-segment-independent policies, CCG needs a more heavyweight update technique,
such as Consistent Updates [63] or SWAN [34], to act as a fallback. But CCG triggers this fallback
mechanism only when the greedy heuristic determines it cannot offer a feasible update sequence.
This is very rare in practice for the invariants we test (§3.6), and even when the fallback is triggered,
only a small part of the transition is left to be handled by it, so the overhead associated with the
heavyweight mechanism (e.g., delay and temporarily doubled FIB entries) is avoided as much as
possible.
The second challenge lies in the verifier. Existing real-time data plane verifiers, such as VeriFlow
and NetPlumber, assume that they have an accurate network-wide snapshot; but the network is a
distributed system and we cannot know exactly when updates are applied. To address that, CCG
explicitly models the uncertainty about network state that arises due to timing, through the use of
uncertain forwarding graph (§3.3), a data structure that compactly represents the range of possible
network behaviors given the available information. Although compact, CCG’s verification engine
produces potentially larger models than those of existing tools due to this “uncertainty” awareness.
Moreover, as a subroutine of the scheduling procedure, the verification function is called much more
frequently than when it is used purely for verification. For these reasons, a substantial amount of
work went into optimization, as shown in §3.6.1.
In summary, our contributions are:
• We developed a system, CCG, to efficiently synthesize network update orderings to preserve
customizable policies as network states evolve.
• We created a graph-based model to capture network uncertainty, upon which real-time verifica-
tion is performed (90% of updates verified within 10 µs).
• We evaluate the performance of our CCG implementation in both emulation and a physical
testbed, and demonstrate that CCG offers significant performance improvement over previous
work—up to 3× faster updates, typically with zero extra FIB entries—while preserving various
levels of consistency.
3.1 Problem Definition
We design CCG to achieve the following three objectives:
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1) Consistency at Every Step. Network changes can occur frequently, triggered by the
control applications, changes in traffic load, system upgrades, or even failures. Even in SDNs with
a logically centralized controller, the asynchronous and distributed nature implies that no single
component can always obtain a fully up-to-date view of the entire system. Moreover, data packets
from all possible sources may traverse the network at any time in any order, interleaving with the
network data plane updates. How can we continuously enforce consistency properties, given the
incomplete and uncertain network view at the controller?
2) Customizable Consistency Properties. The range of desired consistency properties of
networks is quite diverse. For example, the successful operations of some networks may depend on a
set of paths traversing a firewall, certain “classified” hosts being unreachable from external domains,
enforcement of access control to protect critical assets, balanced load across links, loop freedom,
etc. As argued in [46], a generic framework to handle general properties is needed. Researchers have
attempted to ensure certain types of consistency properties, e.g., loop freedom or absence of packet
loss [34, 45], but those studies do not provide a generalized solution. Dionysus [36], as stated
earlier, generalizes the scope of consistency properties it deals with, but still requires designing
specific algorithms for different invariants. Consistent Updates [63] is probably the closest solution
to support general consistency properties because it provides the relatively strong property of
packet coherence which is sufficient to guarantee many other properties; but as we will see next, it
sacrifices efficiency.
3) Efficient Update Installation. The network controller should react in a timely fashion
to network changes to minimize the duration of performance drops and network errors. There
have been proposals [34, 38, 45, 54, 63] that instill correctness according to a specific consistency
property, but these approaches suffer substantial performance penalties. For example, the waiting
time between phases using the two-phase update scheme proposed in CU [63] is at least the max-
imum delay across all the devices, assuming a completely parallel implementation. Dionysus [36]
was recently proposed to update networks via dynamic scheduling atop a consistency-preserving
dependency graph. However, it requires implementing a new algorithm and dependency graph
for each new invariant to achieve good performance. For example, a packet coherence invariant
needs one algorithm and a waypoint invariant would need another algorithm. In contrast, our
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approach reduces the consistency problem to a general network verification problem, which can
take a broad range of invariants as inputs. In particular, one only needs to specify the verification
function instead of designing a new algorithm. This approach also grants CCG the ability to deal
with wildcard rules efficiently, in the same way as general verification tools, whereas Dionysus only
works for applications with exact match on flows or classes of flows.
3.2 Overview
CCG converts the update scheduling problem into a network verification problem. Our overall
approach is shown in Figure 4.1. Our uncertainty-aware network model (§3.3.2) provides a compact
symbolic representation of the different possible states the network could be in, providing input
for the verification engine. The verification engine is responsible for verifying application updates
against specified invariants and policies (§3.3.4). Based on verification results, CCG synthesizes
an efficient update plan to preserve policy consistency during network updates, using the basic
heuristic and a more heavyweight fallback mechanism as backup (§3.4.1 and §3.4.3). One key
feature of CCG is that it operates in a black-box fashion, providing a general platform with a very
flexible notion of consistency. For example, one can “plug in” a different verification function and




















Figure 3.1: System architecture of CCG.
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3.3 Verification under Uncertainty
We start by describing the problem of network uncertainty (§3.3.1), and then present our
solution to model a network in the presence of uncertainty (§3.3.2 and §3.3.3). Our design centers
around the idea of uncertain forwarding graphs, which compactly represent the entire set of possible
network states from the standpoint of packets. Next, we describe how we use our model to perform
uncertainty-aware network verification (§3.3.4).
3.3.1 The Network Uncertainty Problem
Networks must disseminate state among distributed and asynchronous devices, which leads to
the inherent uncertainty that an observation point has in knowing the current state of the network.
We refer to the time period during which the view of the network from an observation point
(e.g., an SDN controller) might be inconsistent with the actual network state as temporal network
uncertainty. The uncertainty could cause network behaviors to deviate from the desired invariants
temporarily or even permanently.
Figure 3.2 shows a motivating example. Initially, switch A has a forwarding rule directing traffic
to switch B. Now the operator wants to reverse the traffic by issuing two instructions in sequence:
(1) remove the rule on A, and (2) insert a new rule (directing traffic to A) on B. But it is possible
that the second operation finishes earlier than the first one, causing a transient loop that leads to
packet losses. That is not an uncommon situation; for example, three out of eleven bugs found










Figure 3.2: Example: challenge of modeling networks in the presence of uncertainty.
Such errors may have serious consequences. In the previous example, the resulting packet losses
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could cause a significant performance drop. A recent study [? ] shows TCP transfers with loss
may take five times longer to complete. Other transient errors could violate security policy, e.g.,
malicious packets could enter a secure zone because of a temporary access control violation [63].
To make matters worse, errors caused by unawareness of network temporal uncertainty can be
permanent. For instance, a control program initially instructs a switch to install one rule, and
later removes that rule. The two instructions can be reordered at the switch [30], which ultimately
causes the switch to install a rule that ought to be removed. The view of the controller and the
network state will remain inconsistent until the rule expires. One may argue that inserting a
barrier message in between the two instructions would solve the problem. However, this may harm
performance because of increasing control traffic and switch operations. There are also scenarios
in which carefully crafting an ordering does not help [63]. In addition, it is difficult for a controller
to figure out when to insert the barrier messages. CCG addresses that by serializing only updates
that have potential to cause race conditions that violate an invariant (§3.5).
3.3.2 Uncertainty Model
We first briefly introduce our prior work VeriFlow, a real-time network-wide data plane verifier.
VeriFlow intercepts every update issued by the controller before it hits the network and verifies its
effect in real time. VeriFlow first slices the set of possible packets into Equivalence Classes (ECs)
of packets using all existing forwarding rules and the new update. Each EC is a set of packets
that experiences the same forwarding actions throughout the network. Next, VeriFlow builds a
forwarding graph for each EC affected by the update, by collecting forwarding rules influencing the
EC. Lastly, VeriFlow traverses each of these graphs to verify network-wide invariants.
Naively, to model network uncertainty, for every update, we need two graphs to symbolically
represent the network behavior with and without the effect of the update for each influenced
EC, until the controller is certain about the status of the update. If n updates are concurrently
“in flight” from the controller to the network, we would need 2n graphs to represent all possible
sequences of update arrivals. Such a state-space explosion will result in a huge memory requirement
and excessive processing time to determine consistent update orderings.
To address that, we efficiently model the network forwarding behavior as a uncertain forwarding
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graph, whose links can be marked as certain or uncertain. A forwarding link is uncertain if the
controller does not yet have information on whether that corresponding update has been applied
to the network. The graph is maintained by the controller over time. When an update is sent, its
effect is applied to the graph and marked as uncertain. After receipt of an acknowledgment from
the network that an update has been applied (or after a suitable timeout), the state of the related
forwarding link is changed to certain. Such a forwarding graph represents all possible combinations
of forwarding decisions at all the devices.
In this way, the extra storage required for uncertainty modeling is linearly bounded by the
number of uncertain rules. We next examine when we can resolve uncertainty, either confirming a
link as certain or removing it.
Figure 3.3: CCG’s uncertain forwarding graph.
3.3.3 Dynamic Updating of the Model
In order to model the most up-to-date network state, we need to update the model as changes
happen in the network. At first glance, one might think that could be done simply by marking
forwarding links as uncertain when new updates are sent, and then, when an ack is received from
the network, marking them as certain. The problem with that approach is that it may result in
inconsistencies from the data packets’ perspective. Consider a network consisting of four switches,
as in Figure 3.4.










Figure 3.4: Example: challenge of dealing with non-atomicity of packet traversal.
reach Switch s4. Initially, at time t0, Switch s3 has a filtering rule to drop packets from that
source, whereas all the other switches simply pass packets through. The operator later wants to
drop packets on s1 instead of s3. To perform the transition in a conservative way, the controller
first adds a filtering rule on s1 at t1, then removes the filtering rule on s3 at t2, after the first rule
addition has been confirmed.
The forwarding graphs at all steps seem correct. However, if a packet enters s1 before t1 and
reaches s3 after t2, it will reach s4, which violates the policy. Traversal of a packet over the
network is not atomic, interleaving with network updates, as also observed in [63]. Moreover, [?
] recently proved that there are situations where no correct update order exists. To deal with
it, upon receiving an ack from the network, CCG does not immediately mark the state of the
corresponding forwarding link as certain. Instead, it delays application of the confirmation to its
internal data structure. In fact, confirmations of additions of forwarding links in the graph model
can be processed immediately, and only confirmations of removals of forwarding links need to be
delayed. The reason is that we want to ensure we represent all the possible behaviors of the network.
Even after a forwarding rule has been deleted, packets processed by the rule may still exist in the
network, buffered in an output queue of that device, in flight, or on other devices.
We have proved that our uncertainty-aware model is able to accurately capture the view of the
network from the packets’ perspective A, even for in-flight packets that have been affected by rules
not currently present.
Definition 3.1. A packet P ’s view of the network agrees with the uncertainty-aware model, if at
any time point during its traversal of the network, the data plane state that the packet encounters
is in the model at that time point. More specifically, at time t, to P if a link l
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• is reachable, l is in the graph model for P at t;
• otherwise, l is definitely not certain in the graph at t.
Theorem 3.1. Assuming that all data plane changes are initiated by the controller, any packet’s
view of the network agrees with the uncertainty-aware model.
3.3.4 Uncertainty-aware Verification
Construction of a correct network verification tool is straightforward with our uncertainty-aware
model. By traversing the uncertainty graph model using directed graph algorithms, we can answer
queries such as whether a reachable path exists between a pair of nodes. That can be done in a
manner similar to existing network verification tools like HSA [39] and VeriFlow [43]. However,
the traversal process needs to be modified to take into account uncertainty. When traversing an
uncertain link, we need to keep track of the fact that downstream inferences lack certainty. If we
reach a node with no certain outgoing links, it is possible that packets will encounter a black-hole
even with multiple uncertain outgoing links available. By traversing the graph once, CCG can
reason about the network state correctly in the presence of uncertainty, determine if an invariant
is violated, and output the set of possible conterexamples (e.g., a packet and the forwarding table
entries that caused the problem).
3.4 Consistency under Uncertainty
In this section, we describe how we use our model to efficiently synthesize update sequences
that obey a set of provided invariants (§3.4.1). We then identify a class of invariants that can be
guaranteed in this manner (§3.4.2), and present our technique to preserve consistency for broader
types of invariants (§3.4.3).
3.4.1 Enforcing Correctness with Greedily Maximized Parallelism
The key goal of our system is to instill user-specified notions of correctness during network
transitions. The basic idea is relatively straightforward. We construct a buffer of updates received
from the application, and attempt to send them out in FIFO order. Before each update is sent,
39
we check with the verification engine on whether there is any possibility, given the uncertainty
in network state, that sending it could result in an invariant violation. If so, the update remains
buffered until it is safe to be sent.
There are two key problems with this approach. The first is head-of-line blocking: it may be safe
to send an update, but one before it in the queue, which isn’t safe, could block it. This introduces
additional delays in propagating updates. Second, only one update is sent at a time, which is
wasteful—if groups of updates do not conflict with each other, they could be sent in parallel.
To address this, CCG provides an algorithm for synthesizing update sequences to networks that
greedily maximizes parallelism while simultaneously obeying the supplied properties (Algorithm 1).
Whenever an update u is issued from the controller, CCG intercepts it before it hits the
network. Network forwarding behavior is modeled as an uncertainty graph (Guncertain) as described
previously. Next, the black-box verification engine takes the graph and the new update as input,
and performs a computation to determine whether there is any possibility that the update will cause
the graph state to violate any policy internally specified within this engine. If the verification is
passed, the update u is sent to the network and also applied to the network model Model, but
marked as uncertain. Otherwise, the update is buffered temporarily in Buf .
When a confirmation of u from the network arrives, CCG also intercepts it. The status of u in
Model is changed to certain, either immediately (if u doesn’t remove any forwarding link from the
graph), or after a delay (if it does, as described in §3.3.3). The status change of u may allow some
pending updates that previously failed the verification to pass it. Each of the buffered updates is
processed through the routine of processing a new update, as described above.
In this way, CCG maintains the order of updates only when it matters. Take the example in
Figure 3.2. If the deletion of rule 1 is issued before the addition of rule 2 is confirmed, CCG’s
verification engine will capture a possible loop, and thus will buffer the deletion update. Once the
confirmation of adding rule 2 arrives, CCG checks buffered updates, and finds out that now it’s
safe to issue the deletion instruction.
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Algorithm 3.1 Maximizing network update parallelism
ScheduleIndividualUpdate(Model,Buf, u)
On issuing u:
Guncertain = ExtractGraph(Model, u)
verify = BlackboxVerification(Guncertain, u)








for ub ∈ Buf do
Guncertain = ExtractGraph(Model, ub)
verify = BlackboxVerification(Guncertain, ub)
if verify == PASS then
Remove ub from Buf
Update(Model, ub, uncertain)
Issue updates← Issue updates+ ub
Issue Issue updates
3.4.2 Segment Independence
Next, we identify a class of invariants for which a feasible update ordering exists, and for which
CCG’s heuristic will be guaranteed to find one such order. As defined in [63], trace properties
characterize the paths that packets traverse through the network. This covers many common
network properties, including reachability, access control, loop freedom, and waypointing. We
start with the assumption that a network configuration applies to exactly one equivalence class
of packets. A network configuration can be expressed as a set of paths that packets are allowed
to take, i.e., a forwarding graph. A configuration transition is equivalent to a transition from an
initial forwarding graph, G0, to a final graph, Gf , through a series of transient graphs, Gt, for
t ∈ {1, . . . , f − 1}. We assume throughout that the invariant of interest is preserved in G0 and Gf .
Loop and black-hole freedom The following theorems were proved for loop freedom [28]: First,
given both G0 and Gf are loop-free, during transition, it is safe (causing no loop) to update a node
in any Gt, if that node satisfies one of the following two conditions: (1) in Gt it is a leaf node, or all
its upstream nodes have been updated with respect to Gf ; or (2) in Gf it reaches the destination
directly, or all its downstream nodes in Gf have been updated with respect to Gf . Second, if there
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are several updatable nodes in a Gt, any update order among these nodes is loop-free. Third, in
any loop-free Gt (including G0) that is not Gf , there is at least one node safe to update, i.e., a
loop-free update order always exists.
Similarly, we have the following proved for the black-hole freedom property [4].
Lemma 3.1. (Updatable condition): A node update does not cause any transient black-hole, if in
Gf , the node reaches the destination directly, or in Gt, all its downstream nodes in Gf have already
been updated.
Proof. By contradiction. Let N0, N1,...Nn be downstream nodes of Na in Gf . Assume N0, N1,...Nn
have been updated with respect to Gf in Gt. After updating Na in Gt, N0, N1,...Nn become Na’s
downstream nodes and all nodes in the chain from Na to Nn have been updated. Na’s upstream
with respect to Gt can still reach Na, and thus reach the downstream of Na. If we assume there is
a black-hole from updating Na, there exists a black-hole in the chain from Na to Nn. Therefore,
the black-hole will exist in Gf , and there is a contradiction.
Lemma 3.2. (Simultaneous updates): Starting with any Gt, any update order among updatable
nodes is black-hole-free.
Proof. Consider a updatable node Na such that all its downstream nodes in Gf have already been
updated in Gt (Lemma 1). Then updating any other updatable node does not change this property.
When a node is updatable it remains updatable even after updating other nodes. Therefore, if there
are several updatable nodes, they can be updated in any order or simultaneously.
Theorem 3.2. (Existence of a black-hole-free update order): In any black-hole-free Gt that is not
Gf (including G0), at least one of the nodes is updatable, i.e., there is a black-hole-free update
order.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume there is a transient graph Gt such that no node is updatable.
All nodes are either updated or not updatable. As nodes with direct links to the destination are
updatable (Lemma 1), these nodes can only be updated. Then nodes at previous hop of these nodes
in Gt are also updatable (Lemma 1), and therefore these nodes must also be updated. Continuing,
it follows that all nodes are updated, which is a contradiction as Gt = Gf . As there is always a
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node updatable in a consistent Gt, and the updatable node can be updated to form a new consistent
Gt, the number of updated nodes will increase. Eventually, all nodes will be updated. Therefore
there is a black-hole free update order.
Any update approved by CCG results in a consistent transient graph, so CCG always finds a
consistent update sequence to ensure loop and black-hole freedom.
Generalized Trace Properties To get a uniform abstraction for trace properties, let us first
visit the basic connectivity problem: node A should reach node B (A → B). To make sure
there is connectivity between two nodes, both black-hole and loop freedom properties need to
hold. Obviously, black-hole freedom is downstream-dependent (Theorem 2), whereas loop freedom
is upstream- (updatable condition (1)) or downstream-dependent (updatable condition (2)), and
thus weaker than black-hole freedom. In other words, connectivity is a downstream-dependent
property, i.e., updating from downstream to upstream is sufficient to ensure it. Fortunately, a
number of trace properties, such as waypointing, access control, service/middle box chaining, etc.,
can be broken down to basic connectivity problems. A common characteristic of such properties is
that flows are required to traverse a set of waypoints.
Definition 3.2. Waypoints-based trace property: A property that specifies that each packet
should traverse a set of waypoints (including source and destination) in a particular order.
Definition 3.3. Segment dependency: Suppose a trace property specifies n waypoints, which
divide the old and the new flow path each into (n − 1) segments: old1, old2, ..., oldn−1 and
new1, new2, ..., newn−1. If newj crosses oldi (i 6= j), then the update of segment j is depen-
dent on the update of segment i, i.e., segment j cannot start to update until segment i’s update
has finished, in order to ensure the traversal of all waypoints.
Otherwise, if segment j starts to update before i has finished, there might be violations. If
j < i, there might be a moment when the path between waypoints j and i+1 consists only of newj
and part of oldi, i.e., waypoints (j + 1)...i are skipped. As in Figure 3.5(b), B may be skipped if
the AB segment is updated before BC, and the path is temporarily A→ 2→ C.
If j > i, there might be a moment when the path between waypoints i and (j + 1) consists
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of oldi, oldi+1, ..., newj , and a loop is formed. As in Figure 3.5(c), the path could temporarily be
A→ B → 1→ B.
If there is no dependency among segments (Figure 3.5 (a)), then each can be updated inde-
pendently simply by ensuring connectivity between the segment’s endpoints. That suggests that
for paths with no inter-segment dependencies, a property-compliant update order always exists.
Another special case is circular dependency between segments, as depicted in Figure 3.5(d), in
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A B C1 D
(d) Old path: A → 1 → B → 2 → C, new path: A →
2→ B → 1→ C. New BC crosses old AB, and new
AB crosses old BC, so BC and AB have circular
dependency between themselves.
Figure 3.5: Examples: dependencies between segments. Path AC is divided into two segments AB and BC
by three waypoints A, B, and C, with old paths in solid lines, and new paths in dashed lines.
Theorem 3.3. If there is no circular dependency between segments, then an update order that
preserves the required property always exists. In particular, if policies are enforcing no more than
two waypoints, an update order always exists.
If a policy introduces no circular dependency, i.e., at least one segment can be updated inde-
pendently (Figure 3.5(a-c)), then we say the policy is segment independent. However, in reality,
forwarding links and paths may be shared by different sets of packets, e.g., multiple flows. Thus
it is possible that two forwarding links (smallest possible segments) l1 and l2 will have conflicting
dependencies when serving different groups of packets, e.g., in forwarding graphs destined to two
different IP prefixes. In such cases, circular dependencies are formed across forwarding graphs.
Fortunately, forwarding graphs do not share links in many cases. For example, as pointed out
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in [36], a number of flow-based traffic management applications for the network core (e.g., Elastic-
Tree, MicroTE, B4, SWAN [18, 32, 34, 35]), any forwarding rule at a switch matches at most one
flow.
Other Properties There are trace properties which are not waypoint-based, such as quantita-
tive properties like path length constraint. To preserve such properties and waypoint-based trace
properties that are not segment independent, we can use other heavyweight techniques as a fall-
back (see 3.4.3), such as CU [63]. Besides, there are network properties beyond trace properties,
such as congestion freedom, and it has been proven that careful ordering of updates cannot always
guarantee congestion freedom [34, 66]. To ensure congestion freedom, one approach is to use other
heavyweight tools, such as SWAN [34], as a fallback mechanism that the default heuristic algorithm
can trigger only when necessary.
3.4.3 Synthesis of Consistent Update Schedules
When desired policies do not have the segment-independence property (§3.4.2), it is possible
that some buffered updates (through very rare in our experiments) never pass the verification.
For instance, consider a circular network with three nodes, in which each node has two types of
rules: one type to forward packets to destinations directly connected to itself, and one default
rule, which covers destinations connected to the other two switches. Initially, default rules point
clockwise. They later change to point counterclockwise. No matter which of the new default rules
changes first, a loop is immediately caused for some destination. The loop freedom property is not
segment-independent in this case, because each default rule is shared by two equivalence classes
(destined to two hosts), which results in conflicting dependencies among forwarding links.
To handle such scenarios, we adopt a hybrid approach (Algorithm 2). If the network operators
desire some policies that can be guaranteed by existing solutions, e.g., CU or SWAN, such solutions
can be specified and plugged in as the fallback mechanism, FB. The stream of updates is first
handled by CCG’s greedy heuristic (Algorithm 1) as long as the policy is preserved. Updates that
violate the policy are buffered temporarily. When the buffering time is over threshold T , configured
by the operator, the fallback mechanism is triggered. The remaining updates are fed into FB to be
transformed to a feasible sequence, and then Algorithm 1 proceeds with them again to heuristically
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Algorithm 3.2 Synthesizing update orderings
ScheduleUpdates(Model,Buf, U, FB, T )
for u ∈ U do
ScheduleIndividualUpdate(Model,Buf, u)
On timeout(T ):
Ũ = Translate(Buf, FB)
for u ∈ Ũ do
ScheduleIndividualUpdate(Model,Buf, u)
maximize update parallelism. In that way, CCG can always generate a consistent update sequence,
assuming a fallback mechanism exists which can guarantee the desired invariants.1 Note that even
with FB triggered, CCG achieves better efficiency than using FB alone to update the network,
because: 1) in the common case, most of updates are not handled by FB; 2) CCG only uses FB
to “translate” buffered updates and then heuristically parallelize issuing the output of FB, but
doesn’t wait explicitly as some FB mechanism does, e.g., the waiting time between two phases in
CU.
To show the feasibility of that approach, we implemented both CU [63] (see §3.6) and SWAN
[34] as our fallback mechanisms in CCG. We emulated traffic engineering (TE) and failure recov-
ery (FR), similar to Dionysus [36], in the network shown in Figure 3.6. Network updates were
synthesized to preserve congestion-freeness using CCG (with SWAN as plug-in), and for compar-
ison, using SWAN alone. In the TE case, we changed the network traffic to trigger new routing
updates to match the traffic. In the FR case, we turned down the link S3-S8 so that link S1-S8 was
overloaded. Then the FR application computed new updates to balance the traffic. The detailed
events that occurred at all eight switches are depicted in Figure 3.7. We see that CCG ensured
the same consistency level, but greatly enhanced parallelism, and thus achieved significant speed
improvement (1.95× faster in the TE case, and 1.97× faster in the FR case).
1If no appropriate fallback exists, and the invariant is non-segment-independent, CCG can no longer guarantee
the invariant. In this case, CCG can offer a “best effort” mechanism to maintain consistency during updates by
simply releasing buffered updates to the network after a configurable threshold of time. This approach might even













































































Figure 3.7: Time series of events that occurred across all switches: (a) SWAN + CCG, traffic
engineering; (b) SWAN, traffic engineering; (c) SWAN + CCG, failure recovery; (d) SWAN,
failure recovery.
3.5 Implementation
We describe four key aspects of our implementation: 1) how to efficiently construct and
maintain the uncertainty-aware model, 2) how to bound temporary uncertainty, 3) how to accelerate
verification with storage data structure optimization, and 4) how to support bandwidth checking.
3.5.1 Representing Network Uncertainty
In our uncertainty graph, we need to keep track of the state of each link. At first glance, we
can do this by keeping a simple state machine for each link, which has two states: certain, and
uncertain. However, two states are not sufficient, as there are some complexities which arise in
practice. For example, there may be dependencies across updates – the question of whether to
mark a link as certain can depend on updates that follow.
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To address this, CCG keeps track of the state of each rule, and associate them each with a
status of uncertainty as well as two counters. The status of uncertainty could be one in the set
{uncertain, certain, pre-certain, unknown}. The counter, add cnt, records the number of insertions
of the rule, and the counter, del cnt records the number of deletions.
Figure 3.8 shows the state machine of our uncertainty-aware model. The certain and uncertain
states are consistent with the notion during modeling phase. The pre-certain and unknown require
some additional explanation, which we will clarify through an example. Suppose that rule (update)
R is issued by the controller. Before the controller receives an acknowledgement of R, the status
of R in our storage data structure (discussed later in §3.5.3) is uncertain and its add cnt counter
increases from zero to one. Once R is confirmed, R’s status is changed to certain, and the add cnt
counter is reset to zero. If another insertion of R is issued before the first R is confirmed, then
the status of R remains uncertain, and the add cnt counter is increased to two. Assume one
confirmation is received now. We are certain that R exists in the network, but there is an in-flight
control message to add R again, which may conflict with a later deletion. Such case is represented
by the status pre-certain. Note that if a rule is pre-certain for adding action (Add pre certain), it
is certainly included in the model. Similarly, if a rule is in the state Del pre certain, then the rule
is not modelled. The status, unknown, describes the case that the same rule is first added and then
deleted (or the other way round), but the controller has not yet received a confirmation of the first
command. Hence, the order of applying the two in-flight commands is unknown, even after both
commands are acknowledged.
3.5.2 Bounding Network Uncertainty
To bound the amount of time that the controller is uncertain about network states, a mech-
anism to acquire confirmations (an indication that the rule has been applied in the network) is
required. Although existing SDN protocols such as OpenFlow do not support general application
layer acknowledgments [55], there are other options, for example, (1) making use of the barrier
and barrier reply messages of OpenFlow protocol, (2) leveraging an appropriately-chosen timeout
or (3) having the controller actively query the data plane. We implemented two versions of the

















































































Figure 3.8: Uncertainty state machine
Flow switch reference implementation, (tested with a Mininet-based emulation), and a mechanism
leveraging the barrier and barrier reply messages on our physical SDN testbed.
3.5.3 Efficiently Storing State
There are several pieces of state that CCG maintains, including network-wide data plane rules,
uncertainty state of each rule (§3.5.1), and buffered updates. The key bottlenecks arise during
the computationally-challenging procedure of storing and processing data plane rules.
The way that CCG stores and retrieves data plane rules is motivated by VeriFlow [43]. The
essential idea is to build a multiple-layer trie, with each layer sub-trie representing a packet header
field. Each level of a sub-trie corresponds to a bit of that field. An upper layer sub-trie contains
pointers on leaves to sub-tries in the next layer. Dataplane rules are stored at the leaves of bottom
sub-tries. A path from the root to a leaf of a bottom sub-trie determines a packet set, and one or
more such sets can be merged together to form an equivalence class (EC) of packets, i.e., a set of
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packets experiencing the same behaviors throughout the network. Upon arrival of an update, its
effect on the network state is checked, by limiting searching to ECs whose behavior may be affected
by this update, and building a graph model for each affected EC. However, given the need to store
multiple different representations of the network state, the storage and processing overhead of CCG
could be larger than just maintaining a single snapshot, as done in VeriFlow. Moreover, there are
rules that perform packet transformation, such as Network Address Translation, i.e., these rules
transform packets from one EC to another EC. To accurately model network behaviors, we need
to able to handle such rules, which are left out in our motivating work, Veriflow. To meet this end,
we design a scalable data structure and an efficient algorithm to operate on it.
Customized Trie Data Structure One complication is dealing with wildcards – rules
agnostic to matching on certain bits or fields. Wildcards complicate the traversal process, as
multiple branches may need to be traversed, and the manner in which they are traversed can
depend on the semantics of the rule (e.g., standard wildcards vs. longest-prefix match). To address
this, we construct an algorithm that handles general bitmasking, then extend it with optimizations
to more efficiently handle two common-case wildcard patterns: full wildcards (the entire field is
wildcarded) and subnet mask (all bits less than a certain significance are wildcarded). To deal
with wildcarding for bitmasks, each node in our trie has three child branches, one for each of
{0,1,don’t care}. For subnetting, the wildcard branch has no children but points direct to a next
layer sub-trie or a rule set. Thus, unlike other types of trie, the depth of subnet wildcard tries is
not fixed as the number of bits in this field, but instead equals to the longest prefix among all the
rules it stores. Accordingly, traversal cost is reduced compared with general tries. As for the full
wildcard field, values can only be non-wildcarded or full wildcarded. The specialized trie structure
for this type of field is a plain binary tree plus a wildcard table.
One-pass Traversal Algorithm When a new update arrives, we need to determine the set
of affected ECs, as well as the rules affecting those ECs. VeriFlow [43] performs a similar task
via a two-pass algorithm, first traversing the trie to compute a set of ECs, and then for each
of the discovered ECs, traversing the trie again to extract related rules. In CCG, we optimize
this process by maintaining some additional accounting information, which lets us accomplish our
similar objective in a single pass. Our algorithm starts from the top layer subtrie, and combinations
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of its branches that match the first field of the update to be checked are selected. The traversal
continues on the matched combinations, and would be further confined by the following fields of
the update. A matched combination of branches in the last level is an EC, and it already points
to the rule set for that EC. Using callback functions and depth first searching, we implemented in
place checking, and finish the modeling work with only one traversal. This algorithm eliminates
both the unnecessary extra pass over the trie and also the need to allocate memory for intermediate
results. In addition, this approach results in a smaller number of ECs—each wildcard branch itself
forms a matched combination.
After getting the rule set for each EC, CCG traverses the graph model consisting of the collected
rules, to check network invariants. One special case is dealing with packet transformation rules.
When such a rule is encountered during graph traversal phase, a new pass over the trie for the
transformed EC is triggered. Note that the graph is constructed while traversing rules, so only
rules encountered before transformation are kept, and the remaining rule set is discarded. More
importantly, in this case, multiple trie traversals are possible, but only when necessary, i.e., when
a transformation rule is possibly forwarding packets for the original EC.
These efforts together with a highly optimized implementation allow CCG to run almost 100X
faster compared to VeriFlow with 15X less memory overhead(§3.6.1). One of our ongoing works is
exploring the parallel implementation of the data structure.
3.5.4 Checking Bandwidth Properties
Thanks to CCG’s graph-based model, it is straightforward to incorporate bandwidth infor-
mation to the model. To keep tract of bandwidth usage, besides forwarding graphs, CCG also
maintains a network-wide physical topology graph. Whenever a set of rules are issued to set up
paths for flows with bandwidth requirement, CCG reserves bandwidth on all possible paths taken
by those flows on the physical graph model. As rules are confirmed to be removed, CCG releases
bandwidth occupied by flows that these rules used to forward. Results shown previously (§3.4.3)




To gain a baseline understanding of CCG’s performance, we micro-benchmarked how long the
verification engine takes to verify a single update. We simulated BGP routing changes by replaying
traces collected from the Route Views Project [15], on a network consisting of 172 routers following
a Rocketfuel topology (AS 1755) [12]. After initializing the network with 90,000 BGP updates,
2,559,251 updates were fed into CCG and VeriFlow [43] (as comparison). We also varied the
number of concurrent uncertain rules in CCG from 100 to 10,000. All experiments were performed
on a 12-core machine with Intel Core i7 CPU at 3.33 GHz, and 18 GB of RAM, running 64-bit























Figure 3.9: Microbenchmark results.
CCG was able to verify 80% of the updates within 10 µs, with a 9 µs mean. CCG verifies
updates almost two order of magnitude faster than VeriFlow because of data structure optimizations
(§3.5). Approximately 25% of the updates were processed within 1 µs, because CCG accurately
tracks the state of each rule over time. When a new update matches the pattern of some existing
rule, it’s likely only a minimum change to CCG’s network model is required (e.g., only one operation
in the trie, with no unnecessary verification triggered). We observed long tails in all curves, but
the verification time of CCG is bounded by 2.16 ms, almost three orders of magnitude faster than
VeriFlow’s worst case. The results also show strong scalability. As the number of concurrent
uncertainty rules grows, the verification time increases slightly (on average, 6.6 µs, 7.3 µs, and
8.2 µs for the 100-, 1000-, and 10000-uncertain-rule cases, respectively). Moreover, CCG offers a
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significant memory overhead reduction relative to VeriFlow: 540 MB vs 9 GB.
3.6.2 Update Performance Analysis
Emulation-based Evaluation
Segment-independent Policies: We used Mininet to emulate a fat-tree network with a shortest
path routing application and a load-balancing application in a NOX controller. The network
consists of five core switches and ten edge switches, and each edge switch connects to five hosts.
We change the network (e.g., add links, or migrate hosts) to trigger the controller to update
the data plane with a set of new updates. For each set of experiments, we tested six update
mechanisms: (1) the controller immediately issues updates to the network, which is Optimal
in terms of update speed; (2) CCG with the basic connectivity invariants, loop and black-hole
freedom, enabled (CCG); (3) CCG with an additional invariant that packets must traverse a specific
middle hop before reaching the destination (CCG-waypoint); (4) Consistent Updates (CU) [63]; (5)
incremental Consistent Updates (Incremental CU) [38]; and (6) Dionysus [36] with its WCMP
forwarding dependency graph generator. We configure our applications as the same type as in
Dionysus, with forwarding rules matching exactly one flow, i.e., no overlapping forwarding graphs.
Thus, loop and black-hole freedom are segment-independent as proved in §3.4.2. Because of the
fat-tree structure, there is no crossing between path segments (as in Fig 3.5(a)), so the waypoint
policy is also segment independent. A mix of old and new configurations, e.g., oldAB + newBC
in Figure 3.5(a), is allowed by CCG, but forbidden when using CU. Note here, we used our
own implementation of the algorithms introduced in Dionysus paper, specifically the algorithm
for packet coherence. Therefore, this is not a full evaluation of the Dionysus approach: one can
develop special-purpose algorithms that build customized dependency graphs for weaker properties,
and thus achieve better efficiency. We leave such evaluation to future work.
We first set the delay between the controller issuing an update and the corresponding switch
finishing the application of the update (i.e, the controller-switch delay) to a normal distribution
with 4 ms mean and 3 ms jitter, to mimic a dynamic data center network environment. The
settings are in line with that of other data center SDN experiments [23, 65]. We initialized the
test with one core switch enabled and added the other four core switches after 10 seconds. The
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traffic eventually is evenly distributed across all links because of the load balancer application. We
measured the completion time of updating each communication path, repeated each experiment 10
times. Figure 3.10(a) shows the CDFs for all six scenarios.
The performance of both “CCG” and “CCG-waypoint” is close to optimal, and much faster
(47 ms reduction on average) than CU. In CU, the controller is required to wait for the maximum
controller-switch delay to guarantee that all packets can only be handled by either the old or the
new rules. CCG relaxes the constraints by allowing a packet being handled by a mixture of old and
new rules along the paths, as long as the impact of the new rules passed verification. By doing so,
CCG can apply any verified updates without explicitly waiting for irrelevant updates. CU requires
temporary doubling of the FIB space for each update, because it does not delete old rules until all
in-flight packets processed by the old configuration have drained out of the network. To address
this, incremental-CU was proposed to trade time against flow table space. By breaking a batch of
updates into k subgroups (k = 3 in our tests), incremental-CU reduced the extra memory usage
to roughly one kth at the cost of multiplying the update time k times. In contrast, when dealing
with segment-independent policies, as in this set of experiments, CCG never needs to trigger any
heavyweight fallback plug-in, and thus requires no additional memory, which is particularly useful


















































(b) Wide-area network setting
Figure 3.10: Emulation results: update completion time comparison.
To understand how CCG performs in wide-area networks, where SDNs have also been
used [34, 35], we set the controller-switch delay to 100 ms (normal distribution, with 25ms jitter),
and repeated the same tests (Figure 3.10(b)). CCG saved over 200 ms update completion time com-
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pared to CU, mainly due to the longer controller-switch delay, for which CU and incremental-CU
have to wait between the two phases of updates.
As for Dionysus, we observed in Figure 3.10 that it speeds up updates compared to CU in
both local and wide-area settings, as it reacts to network dynamics rather than pre-determining
a schedule. But because its default algorithm for WCMP forwarding produces basically the same
number of updates as CU, CCG (either CCG or CCG-waypoint) outperforms it in both time and
memory cost. We further compared CCG-waypoint with Dionysus in other dynamic situations, by
varying controller-switch delay distribution. Figure 3.11 shows the 50th, 90th and 99th percentile
update completion time, under various controller-switch delays (normal distributed with different
(mean, jitter) pairs, (a, b)) for four update mechanisms: optimal, CCG, Dionysus, and CU. In most
cases, both CCG and Dionysus outperform CU, with one exception (4ms delay, zero jitter). Here,
Dionysus does not outperform CU because it adjusts its schedule according to network dynamics,
which was almost absent in this scenario. The cost of updating dependency graphs in this scenario
is relatively large compared to the small network delay. When the mean delay was larger (100ms),
even with no jitter, Dionysus managed to speed the transition by updating each forwarding path
independently. On the other hand, CCG’s performance is closer to Optimal than Dionysus. For
example, in the (4, 0) case, CCG is 37%, 38%, and 52% faster than Dionysus in the 50th, 90th and
99th percentile, respectively; in the (100, 25) case, CCG is 50%, 50%, and 53% faster than Dionysus
in the 50th, 90th and 99th percentile, respectively. Also, we observe that Dionysus’s performance is
highly dependent on the variance of the controller-switch delay (the larger the jitter is, the faster
the update speed) because of the dynamic scheduling, but CCG’s performance is insensitive to the
jitter.
Non-segment-independent Policies: We then explored scenarios in which CCG’s lightweight
heuristic cannot always synthesize a correct update ordering and needs to fall back to the more
heavyweight algorithm to guarantee consistency. The traces we used were collected from a rela-
tively large enterprise network that consists of over 200 layer-3 devices. During a one-day period
(from 16:00 7/22/2014 to 16:00 7/23/2014), we took one snapshot of the network per hour, and
used Mininet to emulate 24 transitions, each between two successive snapshots. We processed
































Figure 3.11: Update completion time with [50th, 90th, 99th percentile]; x-axis label {a, b}: a is the
mean controller-switch delay, b is the jitter following a normal distribution.
Updates were issued such that new rules were added first, then old rules deleted. Thus, all three
mechanisms experience the trend that the number of stored rules increases then decreases.. The
controller-switch delay was set to 4 ms. We selected 10 strongly connected devices in the net-
work, and plotted the number of rules in the network over time during four transition windows, as
shown in Figure 3.12. As the collected rules overlapped with longest prefix match, the resulting
forwarding graphs might share links, so unlike previous experiments, segment-independence was
not guaranteed.
The update completion time (indicated by the width of the span of each curve) using CCG
was much shorter than CU, and the memory needed to store the rules was much smaller. In fact,
the speed and memory requirements of CCG were close to those of the immediate update case,
because CCG rarely needs to fall back to CU. In 22 out of 24 windows, there was a relatively
small number of network updates (around 100+), much as in the [22:00, 23:00) window shown in
Figure 3.12, in which CCG passed through most of the updates with very few fallbacks. During
the period 23:00 to 1:00, there was a burst of network dynamics (likely to have been caused by
network maintenance), in which 8000+ network updates occurred. Even for such a large number
of updates, the number of updates forced to a fallback to CU, was still quite small (10+). Since
CCG only schedules updates in a heuristic way, the waiting time of a buffered update could be
suboptimal, as in this hour’s case, where the final completion time of CCG was closer to CU.
CCG achieves performance comparable to the immediate update mechanism, but without any of









































































































Figure 3.12: Network-trace-driven emulations: (1) immediate application of updates; (2) CCG
(with CU as fallback); and (3) CU.
Physical-testbed-based Evaluation
We also evaluated CCG on a physical SDN testbed [14] consisting of 176 server ports and
676 switch ports, using Pica8 Pronto 3290 switches via TAM Networks, NIAGARA 32066 NICs
from Interface Masters, and servers from Dell. We compared the performance of CCG and CU
by monitoring the traffic throughput during network transitions. We first created a network with
two sender-receiver pairs transmitting TCP traffic on gigabit links, shown in Figure 3.13. Initially,
a single link was shared by the pairs, and two flows competed for bandwidth. After 90 seconds,
another path was added (the upper portion with dashed lines in Figure 3.13). Eventually, one
flow was migrated to the new path and each link was saturated. We repeated the experiment 10
times, and recorded the average throughput in a 100-ms window during the network changes. We
observed repeatable results. Figure 3.14(a) shows the aggregated throughput over time for one
trial.
CCG took 0.3 seconds less to finish the transition than CU because: (1) unlike CU, CCG does
not require packet modification to support versioning, which takes on the order of microseconds
for gigabit links, while packet forwarding is on the order of nanoseconds; (2) CU requires more
rule updates and storage than CCG, and the speed of rule installation is around 200 flows per
second; and (3) Pica8 OpenFlow switches (with firmware 1.6) cannot simultaneously process rule
installations and packets.2
To test CCG in a larger setting, we then utilized all 13 physical switches. Each physical
switch was divided into 6 “virtual” switches by creating 6 bridges. Due to the fact that the















































(b) A 78-switch network.
Figure 3.14: Physical testbed results: comparison of throughput changes during network transitions for
CCG and CU.
switches are physically randomly connected, this division results in a “pseudo-random” network
consisting of 78 switches, each with 8 ports. Initially, the topology consisted of 60 switches, and we
randomly selected 10 sender-receiver pairs to transmit TCP traffic. After 90 seconds, we enabled
the remaining 18 switches in the network. The topology change triggered installations of new rules
to balance load. We repeated the experiments 10 times, and selected two flows from one trial that
experienced throughput changes (Figure 3.14(b)). The trend of the two flows is consistent with the
overall observed throughput change.
CCG again outperformed CU in convergence time and average throughput during transitions.
Compared to CU, CCG spent 20 fewer seconds to complete the transition (a reduction of 2/3),
because CU waits for confirmation of all updates in the first phase before proceeding to the second.
In contrast, CCG’s algorithm significantly shortened the delay, especially for networks experiencing
a large number of state changes. In CCG, the throughput never dropped below 0.9 Gb/s, while CU
experienced temporary yet significant drops during the transition, primarily due to the switches’
lack of support for simultaneous application of updates and processing of packets.
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Table 3.1: Error Coverage Comparison: VeriFlow vs CCG
Error Type Found by Veriflow Only CCG Only CCG
& CCG (Potential) (Certain)
Black Hole 1,037,866 362,460 125,808
Loop 28,936 166,508 166,991
Out of Order Updates N.A. 362,408 N.A.
Total 1,066,802 891,376 292,799
3.6.3 Network Fault Detection Coverage
Failing to consider the temporal uncertainty of the network may result in transient or permanent
network faults that can affect security and performance. In this set of experiments, we explore how
CCG can help to improve the error detection coverage by modeling network uncertainty. We used
the same network topology consisting of that we used for the speed analysis in § 3.6.1. We replayed
2,559,251 BGP FIB changes into CCG and VeriFlow, and verified the network against forwarding
loops and blackholes using both systems. Results are shown in Table 3.1.
The second column shows the number of errors that are detected by both VeriFlow and CCG.
We measure three types of errors: black holes, loops, and out of order updates – the last of which
refers to updates that trigger a race condition on switches, e.g., addition and withdrawal of the same
rule without a barrier between them. We found that CCG does not miss any errors that VeriFlow
captures. The third and fourth column show the number of errors that CCG is able to capture,
but are missed by VeriFlow, among which 891,376 errors are reported by CCG’s verification engine
as errors that may exist, and 292,799 as certain errors.
3.7 Summary
We present CCG, a system that enforces customizable network consistency properties with
high efficiency. We highlight the network uncertainty problem and its ramifications, and propose a
network modeling technique correctly derives consistent outputs even in the presence of uncertainty.
The core algorithm of CCG leverages the uncertainty-aware network model, and synthesizes a
feasible network update plan (ordering and timing of control messages). In addition to ensuring that
there are no violations of consistency requirements, CCG also tries to maximize update parallelism,
subject to the constraints imposed by the requirements. Through emulations and experiments on
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an SDN testbed, we show that CCG is capable of achieving a better consistency vs. efficiency




In this chapter, we will discuss the design of the component that synthesizes network update
content, Network Error Auto-Correct (NEAt). Modern enterprise networks must comply with
highly stringent security demands, including regulatory requirements, or industry standards, such
as PCI, HIPAA, and SOX. As a result, network administrators must carefully design and maintain
their networks to follow those policies, by mapping out device contexts and access to sensitive
resources, assessing risk, and installing access control policies that effectively mitigate that risk.
However, mistakes and errors in implementing the policies can result in costly data breaches,
segmentation violations, and infiltrations. Through 2020, Gartner predicts 99% of firewall breaches
will be caused by misconfigurations [1, 2].
While discovering and troubleshooting these bugs is essential to maintaining network security,
doing so is notoriously hard. Relying on humans to configure and maintain the network configu-
ration is not only prone to mistakes, but slow. Given the sophistication and speed at which new
attack vectors propagate, manually updating and testing new configurations leaves the network in
a vulnerable state until the attack vector is fully secured. Further, maintaining a security posture
in the presence of software-defined networking (SDN) is even more challenging. While SDN enables
new functionality, application designers may not be aware of the policy or security requirements
of the networks on which their applications will be deployed. Worse yet, SDN applications written
in general-purpose languages such as Java or Python can be arbitrarily complex. Requiring appli-
cations to implement and modify their behavior to support a broad spectrum of policies needed
across a broad spectrum of networks presents an almost insurmountable challenge.
To this end, we present NEAt, a transparent layer to automatically repair policy-violating
updates in real-time. NEAt secures the network with a mechanism similar to a smartphone’s
autocorrect feature, which enables on-the-fly repair to policy violating updates and ensures the
network is always in a state consistent with policy. Unlike prior work on update synthesis, NEAt
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maintains backward compatibility and flexibility to run general SDN application code. To do this,
NEAt does not synthesize network state from scratch, but rather influences updates from an
existing SDN application toward a correct specification. In particular, NEAt enforces a concrete
definition of correctness by influencing and constraining dynamically arriving network instructions.
To formulate those correctness criteria, we construct a set of policy graphs to represent humans’
correctness intent, which is based on the observation that important error conditions can be caught
by a concise set of boundary conditions. NEAt sits between an SDN controller and the forwarding
devices, and intercepts the updates proposed by the running SDN applications. If the update
violates an administrator’s defined policy, such as reachability or segmentation, NEAt transforms
the update into one that complies with the policy.
A key challenge we face in this approach is discovering update repairs in real-time. In NEAt,
we build on prior work on verification to efficiently model packet forwarding behavior as a set of
Equivalence Classes (ECs) [43, 72]. Upon receiving an update from an SDN controller, NEAt
computes the set of affected ECs and checks for a violation in the same manner as [43]. To repair
the violation, we cast the problem as an optimization problem, to find the minimum number of
changes (added or deleted edges) to repair the violating EC’s forwarding graph. To rapidly compute
repairs on arbitrarily large networks, we exploit two optimization techniques, topology limitation
which “slices” away irrelevant part of the network, and graph compression, to compress both an
EC’s forwarding graph and the topology. Then we solve the optimization problem on the sliced
and compressed graphs.
Furthermore, as NEAt repairs policy-violating updates, stateful applications — without knowl-
edge of the violating or repaired updates — will diverge from the underlying network state. To
address this problem, applications can interactively propose updates to NEAt and receive noti-
fications of repairs with minor modifications to application code. Thus, applications can remain
unmodified and leverage NEAt transparently in a pass-through mode, with a risk of state diver-
gence, or propose updates in an interactive mode.
A preliminary evaluation of our prototype shows promising results. On topologies with up to
400+ switches and 600+ hosts, NEAt can discover repairs in under one second for applications with
non-overlapping rules, and under two seconds for applications with more complex dependencies.
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Furthermore, we find NEAt can verify and repair updates on realistic data planes. On a large
enterprise network with 1M forwarding rules, NEAt discovered and repaired 28 loop violations.
Simulations on this data set show NEAt can verify and repair reachability and loop freedom policies
in under a second.
4.1 Background and Motivation
Enterprise network policies must compose together requirements from a variety of demands,
such as government or industry regulations, to mitigate risk for attack vectors, and limit access to
sensitive resources. As a result, network administrators must take into account complex, composed
policies when configuring or updating a network.
Composing together such policies is a slow and often error-prone process for a human operator.
The operator may introduce errors translating the demands into high-level policies, or translating
the policies into low-level routing configurations. A recent study [44] found that operators make
changes to their networks at least once per day, while more than 80% were concerned updates would
break existing functionality unrelated to a given change. While tools [39, 43] exist to automatically
discover misconfigurations in real-time, they offer the operator no guidance on how to repair the
misconfiguration beyond the type of correctness property that is violated
Instead, a system to automatically repair updates, ensuring the network always remains con-
sistent with the administrator’s policy, can relieve a slow and error-prone process from the con-
figuration process. If an update violates a given property in the network, a repair should fix the
cause of the violation while maintaining the original purpose of the update. We argue a minimal
change is best, to repair the update with the least number of added or removed edges. Furthermore,
such a system should improve upon a manual effort with transparency in both architecture and
performance. A system that requires hours or days to verify and repair a network is not useful if
the process can be completed manually in just a few minutes. It should also not require modifying
existing applications or redesigning infrastructure.
However, accomplishing this task in real-time is challenging due to the size of the network
and the data plane state. To efficiently reason about the data plane, we build on previous work
in verification [43, 72] that separates the forwarding behavior into Equivalence Classes (ECs) of
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packets. All packets within an EC are forwarded in precisely the same manner. From each EC, we
can extract a configuration graph that defines the forwarding behavior for packets within the EC.
A repair for a given EC must then explore additions or deletions of links in the configuration graph.
Finding a link addition requires examining the topology graph defined by the edges in the physical
topology. To efficiently discover repairs, we propose two optimization techniques to compress the
configuration and topology graphs, described in §4.5. We refer to the outcome of these techniques
as the compressed configuration graph and compressed topology graph.
Finally, a repair system should ideally support both unmodified and modified applications.
Burdening developers or operators with the task of modifying their applications support the latest
extension is unreasonable, but those that want more specific control over the repair process should
have the option to do so. A pass-through mode could allow an operator to transparently leverage
automated repairs, without the need to modify existing applications, while an interactive mode
could provide the application with finer-grained control over the choices of repairs. Furthermore,
an interactive mode would allow the application to ensure its state is consistent with that of the
network, as it can update its own state after choosing one of several potential repairs for the
policy-violating update.
4.2 Design
At the core of NEAt is a verification and correction layer, which ensures only updates con-
forming to the network policies are sent onto the network. This layer receives updates from one of
two integration modes with the SDN control infrastructure: pass-through and interactive.
4.2.1 Verification and Repair
NEAt’s verification and correction engines ensure the network is always consistent with the
defined policy. To start, NEAt takes as input a policy graph ( 1 ), which defines the network policies
(e.g., reachability, segmentation, waypointing) in the form of a directed graph. Next, NEAt receives
updates (e.g., flow modification messages) from the SDN control infrastructure. With each update
( 2 ), NEAt applies the change to a network model, from which the ECs affected by the update






















Figure 4.1: System architecture of NEAt.
policy violations using the verification engine ( 3 ). If the update does not introduce any violations,
it is sent onto the network. However, if it does introduce a violation, the configuration graph and
topology graph are compressed and passed to the correction engine ( 4 ). The optimizer returns a
set of edges to be added or removed to the EC’s configuration graph, which are then applied to
the network model, converted to OpenFlow rules, and sent to the forwarding devices ( 5 ).
NEAt’s correction engine models the process of discovering repairs as an optimization prob-
lem. Our exploration of alternative approaches guided us toward this optimization problem-based
solution for performance considerations. For example, consider a brute force approach that discov-
ers repairs for a given EC by testing all possible permutations of edge additions and removals to
the EC’s configuration graph. A repair that requires only adding edges, from 10 possible unused
topology edges, would need to explore 10! (˜3.6M) permutations. If the violating property can be
checked in just 1ms, each EC could take up to 10 minutes to find a repair. Therefore we use the
formulation described in §4.4 for our repair discovery process.
4.2.2 Interaction Modes
With each repair, inconsistencies between application state and network state will arise. To pre-














Figure 4.2: Interaction modes of NEAt.
modes: pass-through and interactive.
In pass-through mode, NEAt acts as a transparent layer that sits between the controller and
forwarding devices. This mode enforces network policies without modifications to the controller
applications. Both the controller and applications are unaware of NEAt in this mode. NEAt
intercepts updates from the controller, as well as updates from the network about link and switch
state, and passes it to the verification and repair engines.
Interactive mode enables applications to leverage NEAt’s verification and repair process by
checking proposed updates. An application passes to NEAt a set of updates, which are checked
against the current network model. If the updates introduce a violation, NEAt returns a set
of repaired updates, which the application can accept or reject. If the application accepts the
changes, it can send them onto the network and update its state, ensuring the application and
network state are consistent. If the application rejects the changes, it can propose another set of
updates to NEAt. Interactive mode requires modifications to applications to update its state with
the accepted change.
NEAt maintains consistency between the interaction modes, allowing applications and the
controller to both simultaneously benefit from NEAt’s automated repair. For example, one appli-
cation can use NEAt’s API while another remains unmodified, allowing its updates to be checked
by NEAt in pass-through mode.
4.3 Policy as Graphs
Many existing tools reason about individual network paths [41, 43]. While this approach has
proven effective for network data plane verification, synthesizing network state changes requires
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viewing the entire network as a whole (i.e., a graph), as changes that repair one path may influence
the correctness of other paths. In addition, expressing network correctness conditions as a graph
instead of a collection of paths enables dealing with a richer set of policies, for instance, path
consistency and load balancing. Based on this intuition, NEAt takes as input a set of intended
policies, and formulates these policies as directed graphs called policy graphs.
A B(m,n)
Figure 4.3: Policy edge
Edges on a policy graph are marked with notations denoting different types of reachability
constraints. For example, the graph in Figure 4.3 specifies a requirement that at least m paths







Figure 4.4: Policy graph
A basic reachability requirement can be expressed with m = 1 and n unspecified, as shown
in edges A → B and B → C in Figure 4.4. When n is specified, we get a bounded path length
reachability policy (e.g., D → C in Figure 4.4). Shortest path policies can be viewed as a special
case of bounded path policy, and can be encoded in a similar way. When m > 1, the edge expresses
a multipath invariant (e.g., D → C in Figure 4.4), whereas m = 0 specifies that two ends of the edge
are required to be isolated from each other (e.g., E → C in Figure 4.4). Furthermore, concatenating
edges together can denote service chaining type of policies. As shown in Figure 4.4, traffic from
node A should traverse a waypoint B before reaching C. A special case worth mentioning is how to
express a load balancing policy, as this policy typically requires distributing traffic in a certain way













Figure 4.5: Load balancing policy
value, in contrast to the integer values it takes in the previous examples. Figure 4.5 denotes
a policy that requires traffic from client C distributed evenly among five servers. In this way,
NEAt uses policy graphs to express both qualitative and quantitative reachability constraints on
the network.
4.4 Repair Algorithm
In this section, we present NEAt’s core algorithm for repairing violations in real-time con-
strained by a given policy graph. First, we introduce the network model and give an overview
of the algorithm. Next, we describe our formulation of the repair problem for basic reachability
policies as an integer linear programming (ILP) problem. We then generalize this approach to
repair the wider range of policies discussed in 4.3.
Network Model As described in §4.2, upon intercepting an update, NEAt constructs a network
graph model for each affected EC that captures the configure forwarding behavior for all packets
within the EC. This directed configuration graph `c, along with a topology graph T and policy
graph ℘ serve as inputs to the repair algorithm.
Each node in these graphs represents a host or a networking device, and each edge between a
pair of nodes defines reachability between them. The policy graph ℘ is a directed graph constructed
68
from a set of conflict-free policies that represents the expected behavior of the whole network and
hence should not be violated at runtime. Each node in policy graph represents a device or a group
of equivalent devices, and each edge (u, v) represents an expected path from u to v. Policies’
conflict freedom can be guaranteed by tools like PGA [59], which is out of the scope of this study.
A topology graph T is an undirected graph that represents the physical topology of the network.
Algorithm Overview When the verification engine discovers a violated EC, the algorithm is
executed. Its goal is to repair the detected violations optimally, i.e., with the minimum number of
changes to the original configuration. Upon receiving the violated EC c together with its configura-
tion graph `c, NEAt formulates the problem as an optimization problem: we aim to add or delete
the minimum number of edges on `c so that the modified `c complies with ℘c. ℘c is a subgraph
of ℘ that is relevant to EC c. Note that the added or deleted edges are constrained within the
topology graph T . We solve the optimization problem using ILP.
Subsection §4.4.1 describes the repair algorithm for basic reachability policies, and subsection
§4.4.2 enhances the basic algorithm to cope with the entire set of policies in §4.3. We complete
the section with our repair algorithm for forwarding loops (§4.4.3). Table 4.1 summarizes the key
notations used in this section and the next section §4.5.
Table 4.1: Key notations in problem formulation.
Symbol Description
`c
The configuration graph for equivalence
class c.
℘ The policy graph.
T The topology graph.
(i, j) The edge from node i to node j.
ρij The paths between node i and node j.
Cci The cluster of node i for equivalence class c.
ci The compressed node i for C
c
i .
E(a) The set of all edges in graph a.
N(E(a)) Number of all edges in graph a.
NBa(i)
The set of all neighbors of node i in
graph a.
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4.4.1 Repair Basic Reachability
After receiving a configuration graph `c that violates the desired policies from the verification
engine, the optimizer determines the minimum number of edges that needs to be added or deleted
to ensure `c is consistent with the policy graph ℘c using Integer Linear Programming (ILP). We
start with the basic case where ℘c contains only reachability constraints.
Our integer program has a set of binary decision variables xi,j,p,q and xi,j where
xi,j,p,q, (i, j) ∈ ET , (p, q) ∈ E℘c (4.1)
xi,j , (i, j) ∈ ET (4.2)
ET and E℘c denote the set of all edges in T and ℘c respectively. Variable xi,j,p,q defines the mapping
between a physical edge and a policy graph edge. It is 1 if a directed edge (i, j) is mapped to policy
edge (p, q) for the current EC c, i.e., the flow from p to q will be forwarded through edge (i, j)
from i to j. Variable xi,j defines whether or not edge (i, j) is used for forwarding this EC’s traffic
regardless of which flow uses it. Edge (i, j) in T is selected if any flow (p, q) is forwarded through
(i, j) (Equation 4.3). Similarly, for the other direction (j, i), we have Equation 4.4. No physical
link can be selected to forward traffic for the same EC on both directions (Equation 4.5) to avoid
tight loops.












∀(j, i) xi,j + xj,i ≤ 1 (4.5)
Equations 4.6-4.8 are the flow conservation equations for policy level reachability (p, q).
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∀(p, q), ∀i ∈ T : 
∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 1∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i = p (4.6)

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 0∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 1
if i = q (4.7)
{∑
j∈NBT (i)(xi,j,p,q − xj,i,p,q) = 0 otherwise (4.8)
The optimization objective is to minimize the number of changes (additions and deletions) on








4.4.2 Generalizing the Algorithm
To support generalized reachability policies as discussed in §4.3, we encode several additional
constraints into the ILP.
Isolation We introduce a special DROP node. If two nodes are required to be isolated, i.e.,
the nodes are connected with a (0, ) edge in the policy graph, we change the way flow conservation
equations are defined. More specifically, Equation 4.7 is changed to Equation 4.10. That is, a flow
from p to q should sink at DROP before reaching q.

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 0∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 1
if i = DROP (4.10)
Service Chaining With service chaining, or waypointing, we enhance our flow conservation
equations with Equation 4.11. This extends it beyond individual reachability requirements in
the policy, and takes into account dependencies between policy edges. The resulting mapping is
guaranteed to satisfy chaining of reachability requirements. For instance, if a policy node i is
required to reach q through p, because of this equation, i cannot be mapped to the path segment
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(p, q). Otherwise, p might be skipped on the path from i to q.

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 0∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i ∈ ℘c and (∃ρi,por ∃ρq,i) (4.11)
Bounded or Equal Path Length A special case is shortest path policy, where the bounded
length is the length of the shortest physical path. If a path length bound n is specified for a policy
edge (p, q), then a new constraint is added (Equation 4.12):
∑
(i,j)∈ET
(xi,j,p,q + xj,i,p,q) ≤ n (4.12)
Multipath If at least m link-disjoint paths are required for flow (p, q), then the flow conser-
vation equations 4.6 and 4.7 are updated as Equation 4.13 and 4.14 respectively.

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q ≥ m∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i = p (4.13)

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q ≥ m∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 1
if i = q (4.14)
Load Balancing As discussed in §4.3, policy edges within a load balancing policy are denoted
with a decimal path count. Correspondingly, in our optimization problem, variables that map
physical edges to policy edges are also decimal values between zero and one, instead of binary
values. In addition to that change, We introduce a new equation (Equation 4.15) to capture how
flow distribution propagates. ∏
xi,j,p,q 6=0
xi,j,p,q = m (4.15)
For example, consider a physical topology shown in Figure 4.6, where there are two layers of
load balancing between client C and servers S1 − S5. If the policy in Figure 4.5 is required, the

















Figure 4.6: Load Balancing Configuration.
4.4.3 Repairing Loops
The preceding repair algorithm operates on a loop-free configuration graph. As such, we first
check for and remove loops from each configuration graph before compressing and repairing vi-
olations of any other property type. Our objective for repairing loops is to minimize change to
the network, with a preference to affect few equivalence classes as possible, as well as removed the
minimal number of rules. Thus, our algorithm will remove a forwarding rule matching packets
destined to 10.0.0.1/32 over one for 10.0.0.0/8. Since loops are repaired first, and NEAt will later
check reachability properties on each equivalence class, our loop repair algorithm does not need to
consider introducing permanent reachability violations by removing rules.
Algorithm 4.1 Loop repair
procedure RemoveLoop(`c, Θ(c))
# remove edges appearing in multiple loops
remove {(i, j) | (i, j) ∈ θk ∧ (i, j) ∈ θm∀k,m ∈ Θ(c)}
if N(Θ(c)) = 0 then
return `c
for all θi ∈ Θ(c) do
while N(θi) > 0 do
# remove edges forwarded out the destination
remove (i, j) if i is destination
while N(θi) > 0 do
# remove most specific forwarding rule
remove (i, j) ∈ θi with longest prefix
return `c
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Algorithm 4.1 presents our loop repair algorithm. Θ(c) denotes the set of all loops appearing
in a configuration graph `c and N(Θ(c)) the number of loops in `c. θi is a subgraph of `c, and
N(θi) = 0 when the subgraph contains no loops. The algorithm begins by finding and removing
all intersecting edges across `c’s loops. For each loop in `c that is not repaired by removing these
edges, next remove an edge (i, j) where i’s IP address is the destination, if such an edge exists.
While θi still has loops, remove an edge in the loop which has the most specific match rule (e.g.,
longest prefix). Each edge is mapped to a specific forwarding rule at a particular switch when we
compute the equivalence classes.
Removal of a forwarding rule is accomplished by replace it with a drop rule, to prevent a
coarser match in a separate equivalence class from introducing another loop. For example, if a rule
matching destination IP 10.0.0.1/32 is simply deleted from a switch’s forwarding table, another
rule matching 10.0.0.1/31 on the same switch and forwarding to the same next hop could prevent
the loop from being repaired. To conserve switch memory during in response repairs, NEAt checks
all coarser drop rules to determine if multiple rules can be aggregated together.
4.5 Optimizations
While conceptually straightforward, the mapping algorithm in section 4.4 does not scale to a
large network. In the optimization problem formulation, the number of variables for one EC is
approximately the product of the number of edges in the physical topology and the number of
edges of the policy graph, which can easily exceed 100k. In this section, we present two techniques
that dramatically optimize the repair speed.
4.5.1 Topology Limitation
This technique aims to “slice” away irrelevant or redundant part of the network, and thus shrink
the size of the optimization problem. After getting a forwarding graph that violating some policy,
before forming the optimization mapping problem, we first remove disconnected component on the
physical topology. Next, we localize the potential affected area on the topology. Fortunately, most
modern networks are designed in a hierarchical structure. Examples include data centers arranged
in a fattree topology, and enterprise networks divided into multiple sites joint by a backbone
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network. Such a structure implies certain communication pattern: communication within a subtree
should stay local, for example, and communication between subtrees normally doesn’t traverse other
subtrees, i.e., go through a valley. Based on this, in our linear programming problem, typically
only a subset of the topology is considered mappable to a policy edge. Results in section 4.7 shows
the effectiveness of this technique.
4.5.2 Graph Compression
Besides hierarchical structures, most large networks are designed in patterns that enforce sym-
metry to some extent [57] for load balancing or resilience reasons. For example, in a data center
fattree topology, devices on the same layer (access, aggregate, core) are symmetrically connected to
multiple devices on the neighboring layers. We exploit such regularities to compress the graphs that
the repair algorithm operates on. The key to the compression is that the compressed graphs must
be equivalent to the original graphs with respect to the policies of interest. To this end, we lever-
age the graph pattern preserving algorithm [25] as the major building block of NEAt’s compressor
(Figure 4.1). The algorithm compresses a labeled directed graph according to the bisimulation
relation.
Bisimulation Relation [24] We denote G = (V,E, L) as a labeled directed graph. V represents
a set of node and (u, v) ∈ E represents a directed edge from node u to node v. L(u) ∈ Γ represents
the label of node u, where Γ is the set of labels that applied to V . In the networked system context,
the labels may represent a set of similar functional networking nodes, e.g. hosts, firewalls, load
balancers. For example, in Figure 4.7(a), we label the network nodes as Firewall, Edge Router and
Core Router and we label the two hosts as HostA and HostB.
A bisimulation relation on a graph G = (V,E, L) is a binary relation BR ⊆ V ×V such that for
each (u, v) ∈ BR, (1) L(u) = L(v); (2) for each (u, u′) ∈ E, there exists an edge (v, v′) ∈ E such
that (u′, v′) ∈ BR; (3) for each (v, v′) ∈ E, there exists an edge (u, u′) ∈ E such that (u′, v′) ∈ BR.
One can verify that in Figure 4.7(a) Firewall2 and Firewall3 are bisimular to each other, while
Firewall1 is not bisimular to any other firewall. Because HostB is solely in a bisimular cluster,
and hence EdgeRouter1 and EdgeRouter2 are bisimular as they only has one child HostB. As
Firewall2 and Firewall3 have the children that are bisimular, they are also bisimular to each other.
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While Firewall1’s child is Core Router, which has a different label than Edge Router, Firewall1
is not bisimular to anyone.
Core Router
Firewall2 Firewall3Firewall1








Figure 4.7: Example of compression
Bisimulation Based Compression Algorithm 4.2 presents the compression algorithm on the
given graphs `c, ℘c and T . We compute bisimulation relation on `c using the algorithms presented
in [24] and then compress the graphs based on the bisimularity. However, unlike `c and ℘c, T is
not a directed graph, and thus the original algorithm is not applicable. To compute T cp, we first
compress the parts in T that overlap with `c according to the undirected version of `
cp
c . Then we
draw edges between the non-overlapping parts and the compressed parts with their original edges
in T . The time complexity of the compression algorithm is O(|E|log|V |). Figure 4.7(b) shows the
compression result on graph `c. Firewall2 and Firewal3 are bisimular and are compressed to a
new clustering named FW2. Firewall1 stays by itself as FW1. ℘c is compressed in a similar way.
Algorithm 4.2 Graph pattern preserving compression
procedure Clustering(`c, ℘c, T )
compute the maximum bisimulation relation BR of `c
compute the clusters clusters = V/BR
collapse the nodes in the each cluster ∈ clusters









We evaluate the compression algorithm on a simulated fattree topology and a large enterprise
network. We denotes the compression rate rc as the ratio of the number of the remaining nodes in
`cpc to the number of the nodes in the original graph `c. Table 4.2 shows the compression results.
From the result we can conclude that the compression algorithm could result in a much smaller
amount of nodes for large-scale networks.
Table 4.2: Compression results.
Topology 1− rc
Fattree (6750 hosts, 1125 switches) 99.38%
Enterprise (236 routers) 88.98%
Incremental Compression Further leveraging the incremental compression algorithm from [25],
we incrementally maintain the compressed configuration graphs. In response to changes to the
original graphs, the incremental algorithm computes the new compressed graph using the changes
and the compressed graph as input, independent of the original graph. That is there is no need to
decompress the graph to propagate the changes.
Repair Compressed Graphs With the compression module in place, when a violation is de-
tected, the graphs are compressed first, then passed to the optimizer. Note that one compressed
topology graph edge may represent a collection of original topology graph edges. This works fine
with single-path reachability type of policies, such as reachability, isolation, service chaining. How-
ever, it will break equation 4.13 and 4.14 for link-disjoint multipath policy. Our solution is to
label predecessors of a multipath policy destination (E.g., q for policy edge (p, q)) node differently,
such that they are not compressed into one cluster. In addition, the compressed topology graph
is modeled as a weight graph, where the weight on each edge is the number of original edges the
compressed edge represents. Multipath policy constraint Equation 4.13 is modified accordingly as
Equation 4.16, where as Equation 4.14 remains the same because there’s never multiple edges
pointing to the destination node q.

∑
j∈NBTcp (i)(xi,j,p,q ∗ weighti,j) >= m∑
j∈NBTcp (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i = p (4.16)
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Map Back The last step is to map the result back to the original graphs. The optimization
result is a set of changes (added or deleted edges) on the compressed graphs. To map back to the
original configuration graph, a changed edge (ci, cj) could become a set of changed edges between
the cluster Cci and cluster C
c
j . If an edge (ci, cj) is supposed to be added to the compressed
configuration graph, then on the original configuration graph, for every node i in the source cluster
Cci , there should be an edge added from i to one of its neighbor node j that is in the target cluster
Ccj . By the definition of bisimulation, such a node j always exists. On the other hand, if an edge
(ci, cj) should be removed from the compressed configuration graph, then all the edges between
the two clusters should be removed on the original graph.
Afterwards, those computed changes will be translated into forwarding instructions, and sent
to the network devices.
Policy Perseverance At the end, we prove that the compression algorithm preserves the equiv-
alence between the compressed graph Gc and the original graph G with respect to the scope of
policies in section 4.3. The equivalence is proved in [25] for graph pattern queries. A graph pattern
query is effectively asserting single-path type reachability and bounded path length. So here we
only need to prove that the conclusion also holds for multipath policies.
Theorem 4.1. (Multipath Equivalence): A multipath policy for a flow (p, q) holds on G iff the
policy also holds for (p, q) on Gc.
Proof. Consider a multipath policy that requires at least m path for flow (p, q). Trivially, if a
flow (p, q) satisfies the policy on G, the policy also holds for (p, q) on Gc, and flow conservation
equations (Equation 4.16, 4.14 and 4.7) are satisfied. So it’s effectively to prove that the policy





n (n ≤ m) be the set of paths from p to q on Gc that collectively
satisfy Equation 4.16, 4.14 and 4.7. If n equals m, then there are m link-disjoint paths on Gc
between p and q, and thus there are m link-disjoint paths on G, i.e., the policy is satisfied.
If n is less than m, then there must be at least a path on Gc, whose starting edge’s weight is more
than one. Let those paths be pathcm0,...,path
c
mj , whose starting weights are k0, ..., kj respectively.
Consider path pathcm0 first. This means its starting edge is pointing from p to a cluster Cnext which
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contains at least k0 nodes which are also p’s successors. Because the predecessors of q are labeled
differently, each of them is a separate cluster. By definition of bisimulation relation, two nodes are
bisimular (and thus can be clustered together) only if their children’s label set are the same. Via
back propagation, and constraint by Equation 4.7, there must be at least k0 disjoint paths on G
from p’s successors in Cnext to q’s predecessors. Similarly, iterate through all the paths from p to
q on Gc, there are at least m paths from p to q on G.
4.6 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of NEAt in Python. NEAt requires no modifications to the
controller or switches. The verification engine is based on our prior work [43] and we use the
Gurobi Optimizer [6] within our optimization engine to solve the ILP.
NEAt’s pass-through mode is implemented as a proxy between the controller and switches,
listening for flow modification messages. The interactive mode is implemented as an XML-RPC
API, allowing it to be compatible with applications written in any language or for any controller.
In particular, NEAt exposes a check() function that accepts a set of OpenFlow flow modification
messages to check against the network policy. NEAt updates the network model with the proposed
changes, verifies the model, and searches for a set of repairs if any violations are found. The
application can choose to receive the repairs as a set of OpenFlow flow modification messages or
as a set of edge tuples. For example, a load balancer application may wish to receive a repairs as a
set of tuples (e.g., [(s2, h1)]) to easily re-assign a client to a particular server replica, rather than
parsing an OpenFlow message from NEAt.
4.7 Evaluation
In this section, we examine the performance of repairs in NEAt, as well as the end-to-end
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Figure 4.11: Exact matching rules vs. overlapping rules
4.7.1 Repair Performance
To evaluate the feasibility and scalability of NEAt’s repair process, we synthesized a set of
fattree topologies with various sizes, and used NEAt to maintain a variety of network-wide policies,
including reachability, segmentation, bounded path length and multipath policies. More specifically,
on each topology, under random removals of rules, we measured the repair time for each removal
that caused a violation.
4.7.2 Exact matching rules
We first focus on flow-based traffic management applications, which are widely used in SDN [18,
32, 34, 35, 37]. Any forwarding rule produced by such applications at a switch matches at most
one flow. In our terms, each rule only affects at most one EC.
For each fattree topology, we randomly selected a pair of pods. Suppose the desired policy is
that any host in one of the pods should be able to reach every other host in both selected pods,
which we will refer to as a pod-pair reachability policy. With random removals of rules, for those
removals resulting in violations to pod-pair reachability, the optimization engine is triggered to
perform the repair. For testing purposes, we re-verify the policy after each repair, and the check
passed for all cases.
On a fattree topology with 250 hosts and 125 switches, we measured the time taken to repair
pod-pair reachability policy by four mechanisms: (1) plain mapping, (2) mapping with topology lim-
itation, (3) mapping with graph compression, and (4) mapping with both compression and topology
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limitation. Figure 4.8 compares the CDFs of the repair time for these four repair mechanisms: We
can see the combination of graph compression and topology limitation (left most curve) brings
approximately one order of magnitude speed-up over plain mapping (right most curve). Figure 4.9
(a-e) shows the amount of speed-up goes up as the network size scales. Even on a network with 686
hosts and 245 switches, the repair time is bounded under 0.1 second for the majority case, close to
1/20 of the repair time by plain mapping.
We next explored how NEAt handles a larger set of policies and a combination of different
types of policies. We first assumed the desired policy being every pair of hosts should be able
to reach each other , which we will refer to as an all-pair reachability policy. Again, on a fattree
topology with 250 hosts and 125 switches, the repair time under random rule removals against this
all-pair reachability policy was measured, as shown in Figure 4.10. The policy size is increased
by approximately 10 times compared with pod-pair reachability policy, but the repair time only
increases slightly.
To test a even more complex setting, next we randomly selected three pods in the fattree.
Between the first two pods, hosts should be isolated from each other (segmentation), and between
the first and third selected pods, hosts are connected by at least two path (multipath). For host
pairs that do not fall into the previous two conditions, they are supposed to be able to reach each
other (all-pair reachability). Both multipath and all-pair reachability are combined with a bounded
path length policy, to avoid flows between pods ”go through a valley”. Note that unlike the previous
pure single-path reachability policy, where repairs are all edge additions, in this case, a repair is
sometimes a mix of edge additions and deletions. What’s more, to satisfy multipath requirement,
more additions are necessary. Due to this complexity, the repair time is increased, but still on the
same order of magnitude of reachability policy cases, as shown in Figure 4.10. As verified by the
re-checks, changes for fixing different types of policies keep other policy intact.
4.7.3 Overlapping rules
For networks that use wild-carded rules or longest prefix matching, the assumption in the
previous subsection does not hold. One rule may affect multiple ECs, and thus potentially trigger
repairs on multiple graphs. Fortunately, there is a trend to move such overlapping rules to network
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edge or even hosts [8, 20, 48], leaving the core with exactly matching rules. In order to study
how NEAt performs under this less preferable but less common scenario, we assign IP addresses
within the same prefix subnet to hosts within the same pod on the fattree topologies. We then
aggregated rules on the switches as much as possible. For example, each core switch has only k
forwarding rules, where k is the number of pods, and each rule matches on one pod’s prefix. Similar
to the previous experiments, we used NEAt to guarantee an all-pair reachability policy, and our
engine discovered repairs for all violations. Figure 4.11 compares the CDFs of the repair time for
overlapping rules and exact matching rules on a 250-host-125-switch fattree topology. The repair
took longer compared to applications with exact match rules because of the increased number of
affected ECs. With our graph compression and topology limitation techniques, optimization is able

























Figure 4.12: Application-perceived latency of NEAt, on various fattree topologies, showing performance for
a reachability policy with/without graph compression and topology limitation
Next, we examine the application-level delay introduced by NEAt when using its interactive
mode. We test NEAt on various-sized fattree topologies using Mininet [7] and the Pox con-
troller [13]. A learning switch application and load balancer application run on top of Pox. The
load balancer balances flows between the two replicas in a round-robin fashion, and we modify it to
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leverage NEAt’s API to check the assignment of clients to replicas. If NEAt suggests a repair, the
application updates its client-to-replica mapping with one suggested by NEAt. While the learning
switch remains unmodified and unaware of NEAt, its updates are transparently checked by NEAt.
This setup demonstrates the ability of NEAt to interact with the controller and applications si-
multaneously through its two interactive modes.
The load balancer application runs on an edge switch in the fattree topology, with clients and
server replicas placed in different pods. To trigger an update, a client pings the virtual IP of the load
balancer. When the appropriate event handler in the load balancer is execute, it invokes NEAt’s
check() function. We measure the total latency introduced by NEAt as the time to invoke the
check() function and apply it to the application’s state. This includes the time to verify an update
(i.e, calculate equivalence classes affected by the update, compute their configuration graphs, and
verify them) and repair violations in any of the affected equivalence classes.
For each topology size, we examine the total latency for a reachability policy, with and without
our compression and topology limitation optimizations. Figure 4.12 shows the total delay experi-
enced by the load balancer. Topology limitation has the largest speed-up of our optimizations, but
when used in combination with compression of the topology and configuration graphs, NEAt can
verify and repair an update in under 120ms.
4.7.5 Enterprise Network Trace Study
Finally, we examine traces from a large enterprise network, to examine NEAt’s performance
on real forwarding graphs. We examine two dumps of the data plane from 2014 and 2017. These
datasets containing more than one million forwarding rules across more than 200 forwarding devices.
The 2014 dataset contains 27k equivalence classes, while the 2017 trace contains 285k.
4.7.6 Bugs found in a real network
For each dataset, we construct loop and reachability policies and check for violations. In the
2014 dataset, NEAt finds nine different loops. In the 2017 dataset, NEAt finds 19. We examine
the forwarding table and find several of these are caused by default routes with prefix 0.0.0.0/0.
Only equivalence classes with more specific rules on the device are free of loops in these cases.
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Another cause we discover is load balancing – a device can forward packets out one of two ports,
one of which will result in a path containing a loop.
4.7.7 Simulation
We next use the 2017 dataset to evaluate NEAt’s scale and performance on a data plane with a
realistic number of equivalence classes. First, we verify and repair any loops in the 285k equivalence
classes contained in the dataset. We then construct artificial updates, choosing a destination IP
address and prefix length with the same probability as they appear in the dataset’s forwarding
rules. An update can either add a rule, delete a rule, or introduce a loop. Loops are chosen from
the list of those that were discovered and repaired at the start of the simulation. An update has a
10% chance of introducing one of these loops for a particular update, which may introduce loops
in multiple ECs. We simulate 100 updates, affecting an average of eight ECs per update.
We apply the set of random updates to different combinations of policies, including loop-
freedom, reachability, and our compression and topology limitation optimizations. Since the com-
pression and topology limitation optimizations only apply to the reachability policy, we do not
test loop freedom in combination with compression or topology limitation. Figure 4.13 shows a
CDF of the total update time, including verification and repairs (when repairs are necessary). Of
the 100 updates, 20 loops violations needed repair, as well as 24 reachability violations. Median
and 98th percentile update times were 10ms and 1300ms, respectively, for a reachability policy
with compression and topology limitation enabled. For a loop freedom property, median and 98th
percentile update times were 35ms and 730ms, respectively. Combining these two policies, without
compression or topology limitation optimizations, resulted in median and 98th percentile times of
36ms and 193 seconds. Adding our two optimizations reduced these times to 36ms and six seconds.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented NEAt, a system that provides network administrators with a net-
work analogue of a smartphone’s autocorrect. As a transparent layer, NEAt repairs, in real-time,
updates from an SDN controller that violate generic policies such as reachability, service-chaining,














Figure 4.13: Total update time comparison for different combinations of policies and optimizations, on a
model of a real-world data plane trace
order to comply with the policy by casting the problem as an optimization problem. Preliminary
experiments on large fattree topologies show our optimization problem-based formulation can dis-
cover repairs in under one second for applications with non-overlapping rules, and two seconds for
applications issuing rules with more complex dependencies. Applying NEAt to a large enterprise




In this chapter, we review existing approaches to network diagnosis and enforcing correctness
into networks.
5.1 Network Debugging
Previous work on debugging general networks and SDNs focuses on detecting network anoma-
lies [17, 47], checking OpenFlow applications [22], ensuring data-plane consistency [50, 63], and
allowing multiple applications to run side-by-side in a non-conflicting manner [52, 58, 65]. How-
ever, unlike our work, none of the prior solutions provides real-time verification of network-wide
invariants as the network experiences dynamic changes.
Checking OpenFlow applications: Several tools have been proposed to find bugs in Open-
Flow applications and to allow multiple applications run on the same physical network in a non-
conflicting manner. NICE [22] performs symbolic execution of OpenFlow applications and applies
model checking to explore the state space of an entire OpenFlow network. Unlike V eriF low, NICE
is a proactive approach that tries to figure out invalid system states by using a simplified OpenFlow
switch model. It is not designed to check network properties in real time. FlowVisor [65] allows
multiple OpenFlow applications to run side-by-side on the same physical infrastructure without af-
fecting each others’ actions or performance. Unlike V eriF low, FlowVisor does not verify the rules
that applications send to the switches, and does not look for violations of key network invariants.
In [52], the authors presented two algorithms to detect conflicting rules in a virtualized Open-
Flow network. In another work [58], Porras et al. extended the NOX OpenFlow controller with a
live rule conflict detection engine called FortNOX. Unlike V eriF low, both of these works only de-
tect conflicting rules, and do not verify the forwarding behavior of the affected packets. Therefore,
V eriF low is capable of providing more useful information compared to these previous works.
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Checking network invariants: The router configuration checker (rcc) [26] checks configu-
ration files to detect faults that may cause undesired behavior in the network. However, rcc cannot
detect faults that only manifest themselves in the data plane (e.g., bugs in router software and
inconsistencies between the control plane and the data plane; see [47] for examples).
Anteater [47] uses data-plane information of a network, and checks for violations of key network
invariants (absence of routing loops and black holes). Anteater converts the data-plane information
into boolean expressions, translates network invariants into instances of boolean satisfiability (SAT)
problems, and checks the resultant SAT formulas using a SAT solver. Although Anteater can detect
violations of network invariants, it is static in nature, and does not scale well to dynamic changes
in the network (taking up to hundreds of seconds to check a single invariant). Header Space
Analysis [40] is a system with goals similar to Anteater, and is also not real time.
Concurrent with our work, NetPlumber [39] is a tool based on Header Space Analysis (HSA)
that is capable of checking network policies in real time. NetPlumber uses HSA in an incremental
manner to ensure real-time response. Unlike V eriF low, which allows users to write their own
custom query procedures, NetPlumber provides a policy language for network operators to specify
network policies that need to be checked.
ConfigChecker [17] and FlowChecker [16] convert network rules (configuration and forwarding
rules respectively) into boolean expressions in order to check network invariants. They use Bi-
nary Decision Diagram (BDD) to model the network state, and run queries using Computation
Tree Logic (CTL). V eriF low uses graph search techniques to verify network-wide invariants, and
handles dynamic changes in real time. Moreover, unlike previous solutions, V eriF low can prevent
problems from hitting the forwarding plane, whereas FlowChecker find problems after they occur
and (potentially) cause damage. ConfigChecker, like rcc, cannot detect problems that only affect
the data plane.
An early version of V eriF low was presented in [42] but only supported checking for a single




Orthogonal to detecting violations, researchers have also investigated techniques to rigorously
preserve network properties. On one hand, from time dimension, there’s effort on how to synthesize
a feasible network update sequence in order to maintain desirable properties consistently. On the
other hand, there’s also related work on how to build a correct network in the first place, with
better programming language abstractions or synthesis tools that construct network states from
scratch.
Ensuring data-plane consistency: Another train of inquiry [34, 38, 45, 63] focuses on
how to synthesizes a correct update plan to avoid inconsistencies in data-plane, which may cause
undetected transient faults in the network. However, their solutions are too expensive to achieve
real-time performance with heavy flow table storage usage or long updates buffering time. In ad-
dition, the existing approaches are not designed to be flexible enough to verify generic network
invariants. Reitblatt et al. [62] also proposed a language based on regular expressions for synthe-
sizing fault-tolerant network programs, but the operations have to be performed offline.
Other researchers have also noticed the problem of inconsistent view between SDN-controller
and the network states. Peresini et al. [56] proposes a multi-commit transactional semantic at
the controller for ensuring consistent packet processing. Heller et al. [31] presents a big picture
of cross-layer diagnostic framework for systematic troubleshooting in SDNs, and rigorous network-
wide verification which we have explored, is an essential component towards that goal.
Among the related approaches mentioned in §3.1, four warrant further discussion. Most closely
related to our work is Dionysus [36], a dependency-graph based approach that achieves a goal similar
to ours. As discussed in §3.1, our approach has the ability to support 1) flexible properties with
high efficiency without the need to implement new algorithms, and 2) applications with wildcarded
rules. [49] also plans updates in advance, but using model checking. It, however, does not account
for the unpredictable time switches take to perform updates. In our implementation, CU [63] and
VeriFlow [43] are chosen as the fallback mechanism and verification engine. Nevertheless, they are
replaceable components of the design. For instance, when congestion freedom is the property of
interest, we can replace CU with SWAN [34].
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SDN programming languages: Many programming languages have been proposed to
provide abstractions to program SDNs, e.g., Frenetic [27], Pyretic [61] and Maple [69]. These allow
programmers to compose complex rules without the need to manually resolve conflicts between
rules. However, these languages face limitations implementing general policies that deliver higher-
level intent, such as expressing middleware functionality or QoS constraints.
SDN synthesis platforms: Network state can also be synthesized from a set of pre-specified
correctness conditions. NetGen [64], for example, takes as input a specification using regular
expressions to define paths changes and a set of ECs to modify. It uses an SMT solver to find the
minimal number of changes. However, similar to Merlin [67] and FatTire [62], this tool is designed to
be used as compiler, with performance that is too slow for real-time applications (i.e., minute-scale
synthesis). While using NetGen in place of our ILP is possible, doing so would additionally require
translating each update into an equivalent NetGen specification. Similarly, Marham [33] proposes a
framework for automated repair, but with slower performance — on the order of several seconds for
topologies 10s of nodes and links. Margrave [53] analyzes changes to access control policy changes,
highlighting to an operator the effect it has on the policy, without suggesting repairs to violations.
SDN policy languages: In NEAt project, we developed a way to express network policies
as a directed graph to faciliate network automation. The general direction and approach are also
adopted by PGA [59]. Similar to NEAt, PGA also describes policies using a graph structure. But
the types of policies that can be expressed using PGA is limited to reachability and waypointing.
In addition to that, NEAt’s policy representation can model quantitative reachability constraints,
such as bounded path length, resilience and load balancing. However, PGA is proposed as a way
not only to express policies, but also to compose different policies together, which is out of the
scope and orthogonal to the goal of NEAt. For policies that covered by PGA’s policy language, it
would be desirable to use PGA to compose them into a conflict free graph, and input that graph
to NEAt. For other types of policy, it would be interesting to explore ways to resolve conflicts,
possibly following PGA’s approach.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Contributions
This dissertation has demonstrated that it is practical and efficient to leverage user instructions
as guidance to incrementally build/maintain a network state, where desirable properties are auto-
matically preserved all the time. Our vision behind is that to ensure correctness of complicated
systems like modern networks, we should combine the computational power of computers and in-
telligent guidance of humans. With the help of the verification foundation, we are able to know
when and what goes wrong in our network in real time. Then we are able to instill correctness into
the network from both time and space dimensions. First, via repeated verifications and guided by
dynamic network instructions, we are able to synthesize network update ordering and timing that
migrates network between configurations efficiently, making sure no security holes exposed at any
intermediate state. One step further, based on bugs detected by the verification engine, our system
automatically corrects problematic network instructions. We plan to develop a network data-plane
management software that can work with both general networks and SDNs. We will utilize the
techniques developed in this thesis to build the different components of this software suite.
6.2 Discussion and Future Work
Deciding when to check: We may not know when an invariant violation is a true problem
rather than an intermediate state during which the violation is considered acceptable by the op-
erator. For example, in an SDN, applications can install rules into a set of switches to build an
end-to-end path from a source host to a destination host. However, as V eriF low is unaware of ap-
plication semantics, it may not be able to determine these rule set boundaries. This may cause our
verification engine to report the presence of temporary black holes while processing a set of rules
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one by one. One possible solution is for the SDN application to indicate when to check. Moreover,
our verification technique may be used with consistent update mechanisms [50, 63], where there
are well-defined stages during which the network state is consistent and can be checked.
Handling packet transformations: A transformation rule such as Network Address Trans-
lation has two parts – the match part determines the set of packets that will undergo the transfor-
mation, and the transformation part represents the set of packets into which the matched packets
will get transformed. We can handle this case by generating additional equivalence classes and their
corresponding forwarding graphs, to address the changes in packet header due to the transforma-
tions. Although we have put substantial effort in optimizing our verification engine in our CCG
work, including the way it handles packet transformation, it still requires one extra trie traversal
every time a packet transformation happens. This works fine if the number of packet transforma-
tions occurs only a few times per packet, for instance, VLAN tagging and untagging. However, in
the worst case, transformations may happen at every hop (e.g., in an MPLS network), we leave a
full design and implementation to future work.
Multiple controllers: Our system assumes it has a complete view of the network to be
checked. In a multi-controller scenario, obtaining this view in real time would be difficult. Checking
and repairing network-wide invariants in real time with multiple controllers is a challenging problem
for the future.
Synthesis Parallelism CCG synthesizes network updates with only heuristically maximized
parallelism, and in the cases where required properties are not segment independent, relies on
heavier weight fallback mechanisms to guarantee consistency. When two or more updates have
circular dependencies with respect to the consistency properties, fallback will be triggered. One
safe way of using CCG is to provide it with a strong fallback plug-in, e.g., CU [63]. Any weaker
properties will be automatically ensured by CCG, with fallback triggered (rare in practice) only
for a subset of updates and when necessary. In fact, one can use CCG even when fallback is always
on. In this case, CCG will be faster most of the time, as discussed in §3.4.3.
Utilizing hardware primitives: It would be interesting to investigate how to utilize pos-
sible primitives in network hardware to facilitate verification and synthesis, given the progress in
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programmable hardware, for instance, P4 [19].
Deployment Experience Although we have deployed our system on real and virtual switches
in lab and simulated environments, and tested it with real enterprise network traces, we have no
experience in applying it in production networks, and there are unanswered questions. For instance,
how general and important are the network properties we identified? How much impact physical
network changes impose on data plane state? Such experience will be crucial to understand our
limitations and to identify new research directions.
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Appendix A
Completeness of the network model
Let us demonstrate that our uncertainty-aware model can accurately capture the view of the
network from packets’ perspective. We first define the situation when the view of a packet is
consistent with the model.
Definition A.1. A packet P ’s view of the network is consistent with the uncertainty-aware model,
if at any time point during its traversal of the network, the data plane state that the packet encoun-
ters is in the model at that time point. More specifically, at time t, to P if a link l
• is reachable, l is in the graph model for P at t;
• otherwise, l is definitely not certain in the graph at t.
Theorem A.1. Assuming that no physical failures change the data plane, any packet’s view of the
network is consistent with the uncertainty-aware model.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the maximum duration of a packet in the network
is δ, which is set as the amount of delay added to confirmations. Consider a packet P that enters
the network at time t1 and leaves at t2 (t2 − t1 ≤ δ). Assume that P traverses the network in n
hops, and when n = 0, P enters the network. Clearly the theorem holds for n = 0. Consider hop
k, (k ≥ 0 and k ≤ n). By induction, at previous hop (k − 1), assume that P ’s view is consistent
with the model.
If P encounters a forwarding link at hop k, then there exist two cases. In case 1, the corre-
sponding forwarding rule is intentionally inserted by the controller, and by the time P reaches hop
k, the rule is installed. In case 2, the rule is about to be removed, but the action is not done until
P has been handled by the rule. Let ti denote the time of issuing the related command (to add or
remove the rule), and tc the time it is confirmed at the controller as. In case 1, since P reaches
the link, ti < t. In the model, that link is modeled as either certain (tc ≤ t) or uncertain (tc > t).
In case 2, because the link is reachable to P at t, in P ’s lifetime [t1, t2], P ’s view of the network
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state contains that link. tc cannot be earlier than t, because if it were, P could not reach the link.
Because of the delayed confirmation mechanism, if an update u causes the removal of the link, the
status of the rule remains as uncertain for an extra δ time in the model until tc + δ > t2, which is
consistent with P ’s view. In particular, if ti ≥ t, then the link is included as certain in the model
until the update is issued (ti).
If P reaches a location where no forwarding rule is available, there are also two cases. In case
1, some forwarding rules have been issued to handle P at this location, but they have not been
applied yet. In case 2, there had been available rules, but they were removed before t. In case 1, tc
is definitely later than t. If it weren’t, the rule would be there by t. If ti < t, at t, the forwarding
rule is only modeled as uncertain. If ti ≥ t, at t, the model does not contain that rule. In case
2, the removal of the rules is issued before t. In the interval [ti, tc + δ], any rule R is modeled as
uncertain, and after the interval, R is removed from the model, after P leaves the network. Hence,
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